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THE SUPERIOR POSITION OF THE CREDITOR 
IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY REGIME: HAS 
THE COMMUNITY BECOME A MERE CREDITOR 
COLLECTION DEVICE? 
Andrea B. Carron· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The community property regime has been lauded as one 
of the most beautiful and significant achievements of the civil 
law tradition.1 It is widely accepted as the marital property 
regime of choice for an astonishing number of countries, 
including France, Germany, Spain, Brazil, and countless 
others.2 Even on American soil, where the common law 
tradition is generally favored over that of the civil law, the 
community regime has gained significant sway. Nine of our 
states have rejected the English-inspired marital property 
regime in favor of the community property structure.3  The 
• C.E. Laborde, Jr. Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul 
M. Hebert Law Center. I thank William Corbett, Jason Kilborn, and Katherine 
Spaht for helpful discussions on earlier drafts of this Article, as well as the LSU 
Law Center for its generous research support. Kati Cox (LSU Law Center Class 
of 2006) provided excellent research assistance. 
1. See Harriett S. Daggett, Policy Questions on Marital Property Law in 
Louisiana, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 50, 52 (Jan 
P. Charmatz & Harriett S. Daggett eds., 1977). 
2. See Richard L. Conner, Brazilian Marital Property: The Dwindling 
Community, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 705, 705 (1975); Terrance J. Mullin, Column, 
Understanding the Testamentary Effects of Community Property Rules, 79 FLA. 
BARJ. 49, 49 n.1 (2005). 
3. Arizona, C alifornia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and 
Washington have long been community property states. J. Mark Weiss, 
Community Property Interests in Separate Property Businesses in Washington, 
40 GONZ. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004) (citing Nathan R. Long, Community 
Characterization of the Increased Value of Separately Owned Businesses, 32 
IDAHO L. REV. 760, 759-61, 765 (1996)); see also Angela M. Bradstreet, Marital 
Property Law in England and California: A Comparative Study and Critique, 4 
HAsTINGS lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143 , 143 (1980). Wisconsin became the last 
1 
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result is a marital property scheme in a minority of states not 
quite understood by the masses,4 but nonetheless admired for 
its ancient and bold advancements in the area of spousal 
equality and women's rights.5 
In the centuries since its adoption in the American 
community property states, the regime has made significant 
innovations necessary to retain its suitability in the modern 
world.6 Some of these "noble experiments,"7 however, have 
morphed the community property regime into something 
unintended at its inception and somewhat disturbing today. 
Created for the purpose of preserving and furthering 
familial interests,8 the community as it currently exists in 
this country seems to have wandered astray. One scholar's 
analysis of twentieth-century modifications to the regime 
even led him to remark that the modern community property 
regime promotes "the ultimate welfare of no one except those 
parasites who live on litigation-breeding rules of law ."9 On 
the contrary, there is one party-aside from lawyers, of 
course-whose welfare today's community property regime 
clearly and exceptionally promotes: the creditor. 
Creditor protection may be a worthy societal goal, at 
least generally speaking. But the community regime has 
gone so far to provide such p rotection that it has significantly 
departed from its teleology. The family's interest is neither 
furthered nor preserved by the surprisingly broad access to 
property granted to all sorts of creditors of spouses residing in 
community property states. And the family is not the only 
American state to adopt a marital property regime that is considered 
"community" with its enactment of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act-heavily 
based on the Uniform Marital Property Act-in 1986. See Howard S. Erlanger 
& June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community Property: 
Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 769, 769· 
71 ( 1990). 
4. See W. S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 6 ( 1982). 
5. M. R .  Kirkwood, Historical Background and Objectives of the Law of 
Community Property in the Pacific Coast States, 11 WASH . L. REV. & ST. B. J. 1, 
11 (1936); GEORGE MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
§§ 70-74, at 64-67 (2d ed. 1925). 
6. Daggett, supra note 1, at 52. 
7. Richard R. B. Powell, Community Property-A Critique of Its Regulation 
of Intra-Family Relations, 1 1  WASH L. REV. & ST. B .  J. 12, 34 (1936). 
8. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
9. Powell, supra note 7, at 38. 
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victim of this expansion of creditors' rights. The consistency 
and utility of marital property laws are threatened by a 
system that deviates from the fundamental principles behind 
debt collection and favors spouses' creditors. 
This article will begin by demonstrating just how 
creditor-friendly the community property regime has become. 
Part II will analyze the rights afforded spousal creditors in 
the various community property states, comparing them to 
each other and to their non-community property peers. 10 The 
section will then discuss, among other things, the unique 
ability of a creditor in a community property state to seize the 
property of a person with no connection to a debt-only the 
misfortune of having married the debtor-both for obligations 
incurred during marriage and for antenuptial obligations.11 
These rules of creditor collection, when paired with the 
community property states' generally acerbic rules regarding 
spousal ability to contract around the onerous rules of debt 
collection, show the significant protection afforded creditors 
in the community regime. Part III will suggest that the 
regime has indeed become too creditor-oriented. When 
examined in light of the policies behind the regime's 
promulgation and the regime's reluctance to addres s  the 
expectations and needs of the spouses and their sophisticated 
creditors, it will become obvious that the community regime 
has simply gone too far in placing the rights of creditors 
above those of the spouses.12 The reader will certainly be left 
to wonder whether the community property regime today 
serves merely as a creditor collection device. 
II. THE EXCEPTIONAL CREDITOR BENT OF THE COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY REGIME 
Modern creditors in community property regimes have 
access to a mass of spousal property almost inconceivable in 
non-community property states. Of course, they may access 
their debtor's property. But much more may be available as 
well.13 
10. See discussion supra Part ILA. 
11. See discussion supra Parts II.B-C. 
12. See discussion supra Part III. 
13. This article analyzes the creditor collection rules in the nine community 
property states with a rule-rather than jurisdiction-method of organization in 
an effort to demonstrate the regimes' significant preference for creditors. Of 
4 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW 
A. Preventing the "$2 Bankruptcy": Creditor Rights to 
Community Property for Premarital Debts 
[Vol: 47 
One not well-versed in the intricacies of the community 
property regime will likely find the protection afforded 
antenuptial creditors of the spouses among its most shocking 
features. It is axiomatic in non-community property states­
sometimes referred to as "common law states"14-that a 
creditor's collection efforts must be directed solely toward his 
debtor's property.15 When a debtor in a common law state 
marries, the creditor's ability to collect remains unaffected.16 
The mere fact of marriage neither hurts nor helps a third­
party creditor, who may continue to seize any property owned 
by the debtor spouse.17 But this is not so in the community 
property regime. A great windfall comes to the creditor 
whose struggling debtor marries an employed person in a 
community property state.18 That creditor's rights are 
substantially expanded by the marriage alone.19 
While some states now limit creditor access to community 
property for the antenuptial debts of the spouses,20 several 
still provide surprisingly expansive creditor protection. 
Louisiana's community property regime is by far the most 
creditor-friendly on this front. It allows the premarital 
creditor of a spouse for all manner of debts access to the 
course, when any individual community property regime is considered alone, its 
own internal rules may diverge in terms of whether they grant the creditor or 
the spouses more protection. Nevada, for instance, takes a stand exceptionally 
favorable to creditors with regard to the enforcement of matrimonial 
agreements, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1979) (sanctioning separate 
property agreements between spouses), but is less creditor-friendly with regard 
to antenuptial debts. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.050 (1975) (limiting creditor 
access to community property for the antenuptial debts of spouses). 
14. See, e.g., MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 1:1, at 3. 
15. Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage Into 
Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code 
and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 526 
n.177 (2000). 
16. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 10:1, at 478. 
17. Id. 
18. See id. § 10:1, at 479. 
19. See id. 
20: �IZ. REV. STAT. AN_
N. § 25-215(B) (2000) (only value of debtor spouse's 
contr1but10n to the commuruty property may be seized for his premarital debts); 
see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 123.050 (LexisNexis 2004) (non-debtor spouse's 
share of community property not seizable for other's debts contracted before 
marriage). 
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entirety of the community property, including the community 
property interests of the debtor and non-debtor spouses 
alike.21 Other American community property jurisdictions go 
almost as far. Idaho has at least suggested that seizure of 
any and all community property is appropriate for the 
satisfaction of a premarital debt22 and California has 
legislatively recognized an antenuptial creditor's ability to 
seize the entirety of the spouses' community property, save 
any earnings of the non-debtor spouse that are isolated in a 
distinct account. 23 
The history behind Louisiana's move toward full 
community liability for premarital debts is indeed interesting. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court first provided for this 
unprecedented access to all community property for 
premarital debts at a time when state legislation arguably 
prohibited such access. 
The Louisiana Civil Code, from its inception in the year 
1808, 24 provided in article 2403 that "the debts of both 
husband and wife, anterior to the marriage, must be 
21. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (1985). 
22. In Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 69 P.3d 173 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered whether the wages of the 
husband-debtor were properly garnished for his premarital debt (a debt 
incurred with his first wife). Finding no legislation and few cases on point, the 
court held the garnishment proper. Id. at 178. To support its decision, the 
Idaho court cited an early twentieth-century case in which the Idaho Supreme 
Court even allowed seizure of community real property for a husband's 
antenuptial debt. Id. at 177. The modern a pproval of that case suggests that 
Idaho may sanction seizure of all community property, and not just the debtor 
spouse's earnings. The court did not address this question, however, as it was 
not at issue in Action Collection Service, in which the creditor sought only a 
wage garnishment. Future decisions will have to determine whether Idaho will 
take its creditor protection policies as far as Louisiana has. 
23. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 910(a) (West 2004); see also Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 925 P.2d 1002 (Cal. 1996). Of course, the exemption of non-debtor 
earnings is a substantial restriction on the creditor. But the availability of 
other community property, such as community real estate or any other 
"acquisition," aligns California more with Louisiana than with other community 
property states providing more limited access. 
24. The 1808 version of Louisiana's written law was actually not a "Code," 
properly so called, at all, but rather a "Digest," or compilation of incomplete 
rules. By 1825, however, the Digest was replaced with a more or less "true 
Code." See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative 
Essay, 78 TUL. L. REV. 379, 383-89 (2003). In any event, a provision identical to 
Article 2403 persisted from 1808 until the revision of Louisiana's matrimonial 
regimes rules more than 150 years later. 
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acquitted out of their own personal and individual effects."2'' 
Article 2403 was drawn from Spanish sources,26 including 
legislation providing that "each spouse has the obligation to 
satisfy from his separate assets his own (or non-community) 
debts which he contracted before marriage."27 The plain 
language of both the Louisiana enactment and its Spanish 
source provision certainly seemed to indicate that only the 
separate property of each spouse could be seized by a creditor 
for a debt pre-dating the debtor's marriage. Such a result 
appears logical and just, insofar as premarital debts 
necessarily have no connection to the community. The 
satisfaction of these debts, under the Louisiana and Spanish 
statutes, appeared to be limited to property with which the 
debts were connected-namely, the separate property of the 
debtor spouse-leaving the spouses' community property free 
for seizure by community creditors. 
Nevertheless, in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., the 
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of Civil 
Code article 2403 and held that the entirety of the community 
property between husband and wife-including real and 
movable property-could be seized to satisfy the husband's 
premarital debt.28 The court acknowledged that the plain 
language of article 2403 suggested otherwise, but found the 
article to provide a rule of allocation between the spouses and 
not one binding on third-party creditors.29 In the court's view, 
both the Louisiana legislative enactment and its Spanish 
predecessor "anticipated the personal obligations of the 
spouses to each other and did not attempt to fix the 
responsibilities of the community in relation to third 
parties."30 In other words, the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that article 2403 did not preclude creditors of a spouse from 
seizing both community property and separate property for 
25. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2403, 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CI\'IL 
CODES OF LOUISIANA (Joseph Dainow, ed.). 
26. See Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. 1973); see also 
Leonard
_ 
Oppenheim, The Significance of Recent Louisiana Legislation 
Concerning the Marital Community-Louisiana Acts 49 and 286 of 1944 19 
TUL. L. REV. 200, 204-05 (1944). 
' 
27. Creech, 287 So. 2d at 505. 
28. Id. at 499. 
29. Id. at 507. 
30. Id. 
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an obligation incurred before marriage.31 
The court's interpretation of the Louisiana and Spanish 
authorities in Creech was flawed in that it failed to appreciate 
the scope of the application of the community property regime 
in Louisiana. The Louisiana Civil Code articulates rules of a 
community property regime which apply both as between the 
spouses themselves and as between the spouses and third 
parties such as creditors.32 Thus, in the absence of any 
specific provision to the contrary, Louisiana Civil Code article 
2403 should have been interpreted to provide a rule of 
conduct governing both the spouses and third parties. Even 
creditors, under a proper interpretation of Louisiana 
legislation, should be limited to the debtor's separate property 
for debts incurred before the establishment of the community 
property regime. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court's mistake of interpretation 
in Creech is a rather moot one now, however. Five years after 
the Creech decision was rendered, Louisiana undertook a 
complete revision of its matrimonial regimes law.33 Article 
2403 was suppressed and a new law was established in its 
place.34 The new "equivalent" to article 2403 is Louisiana 
Civil Code article 2345, which has remained unchanged since 
1979 and provides that "[a] separate or community obligation 
may be satisfied during the community property regime from 
community property and from the separate property of the 
spouse who incurred the obligation."35 Although the new 
legislation does not expressly address premarital debts, the 
Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently held that the rule 
applies to allow seizure of 100% of the community property 
for both ante- and post-nuptial debts.36 
Historical materials surrounding the enactment of 
31. Id. 
32. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2325 (1985). 
33. Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 
1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. 
REV. 83, 83 ( 1979). 
34. See id. at 85-88. 
35. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (1985). 
36. Rayne State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fruge, 546 So. 2d 637, 640 (La. Ct. 
App. 1989) (entirety of community property seizable for guaranty agreements 
wife signed during marriage without husband's knowledge); see also Bagwell v. 
Bagwell, 698 So. 2d 746, 748 (La . Ct. App. 1997) (holding entirety of community 
property seizable for wife's premarital support obligation). 
8 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 4 7 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2345 reveal little about the 
purpose or motives of the legislature in approving the result 
in Creech and continuing to allow creditors full access to 
community property for premarital debts.37 But other 
community property states' struggles with the same problem 
provide some insight. Most state laws allowing access to all 
or some community property for a spouse's premarital debts 
are a direct reaction to the so-called "marital bankruptcy."38 
Early in the history of the American community property 
regime, following the Spanish model,39 most states rejected 
the liability of any community property whatsoever for 
premarital debts.40 As the United States economy became 
more creditor-focused, though, concern grew over the idea 
that the debtor's marriage often frustrated the separate 
creditor's attempt to collect a debt.41 If community property 
could not be seized for premarital debts, and virtually all 
property acquired after marriage, including the earnings of 
both spouses, became community property,42 the creditor's 
ability to rely on his debtor's earning stream to satisfy the 
debt would all but evaporate. A debtor marrying into a 
community property regime under these old rules of creditor 
collection basically limited his creditor to attempting to 
37. Unfortunately, the legislative debates surrounding the 1979 
matrimonial regimes revision in Louisiana have not been preserved.  
38. See, e.g., Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Seele, 69 P.3d 173, 178 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2003); see also Haley v. Highland, 960 P.2d 962, 964 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1998) (stating that "[tJhe legislature was creating an exception to the judicially­
created rule of marital bankruptcy" when it began to allow acces s  to community 
property for premarital debts in 1969). 
39. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 372 (2d ed.  1971). 
40. See id. at 374-78 ("Properly, one spouse's half share in the community 
property is just as much the spouse's property as is the spouse's separate 
property, and should not therefore be liable for the other spouse's antenuptial 
debts and obligations."). 
41. Recent Developments, Community Property-Antenuptial Debts­
Eliminating Immunity of Earnings and Accumulations of Debtor Spouse­
R.C. W. 26.16.200 as Amended by Ch. 121, Laws of 1969, 1st Extraordinary 
Session, 45 WASH. L. REV. 191, 192 (1970). 
42. See, e.g., Susan Kalinka, Acts 1990, No. 1009: The Repeal of Provisions 
for Separation from Bed and Board Increases the Federal Income Tax Burden of 
Separated Spouses in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV. 597, 603-04 (1993); see also 
Melancon v. Melancon, 928 So. 2d 10, 14-15 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Norwest Fin. v. 
Lawver, 849 P.2d 324, 326 (Nev. 1993); In re Marriage of Marzetta, 120 P.3d 75, 
80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Park Bank-West v. Mueller, 444 N.W.2d 754, 759 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
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collect from the property the debtor took into the marriage. 
The debtor spouse's future earnings would be immune from 
the day of the marriage forward. The problem was dubbed 
the "marital bankruptcy" or the "$2 bankruptcy," as debtors 
were said to be able to effectively shield themselves from 
liability to their creditors merely by obtaining a $2 marriage 
license.43 
It is the possibility of this inequitable marital 
bankruptcy, and the Robson's choice between it and a 
windfall to the creditor arising solely from his debtor's 
marriage, that likely led states such as Idaho, Louisiana, and 
California to begin allowing the seizure of some community 
property for premarital debts.44 The question now, however, 
is whether those legislatures have overcorrected. If 
Louisiana's rule allowing full access to community property, 
for instance, is an attempt to prevent the "$2 bankruptcy," 
has it gone too far? The potential prejudice to a creditor 
caused by his debtor's marriage could be eliminated in any 
number of ways that do not involve allowing a creditor to 
seize all of the spouses' community property and that are 
likewise more protective of the community. It is, perhaps, a 
function of the modern legislative process-in which creditors' 
lobbies abound-that the most creditor-friendly of all 
solutions was chosen.45 
B. Uniting the Spouses in Holy Debt: Seizure of Community 
Property for Debts Incurred During Marriage 
Perhaps the most commonly litigated question 
surrounding debt collection from spouses is that of 
determining what property is available to creditors for debts 
incurred by just one of the spouses during the existence of the 
community regime. To conveniently answer this question, all 
nine of the American community property states are typically 
43. See e.g., Hines v. Hines , 707 P.2d 969, 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); 
Schilling v. Embree, 575 P.2d 1262, 1 264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
44. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under 
California's Community Property Laws: Recommendations for Reform, 34 
HAsTINGS L. J. 227, 247-48 (1982). 
45. See Erwin Chemerins ky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571 , 
590 & n.114 (2005) (describing the activities of a number of "well-funded 
creditor lobbying groups"). 
10 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47 
categorized into one of two systems-the "managerial system" 
or the "community debt system." The labels seem convenient, 
but in truth they are inaccurate. California and Louisiana do 
not appropriately fall under either system, though they are 
usually classified as managerial system states. 46 But even 
more significantly, the choice of one system or the other really 
does little to change the treatment of creditors. Under both 
systems, creditors-albeit through the use of different 
mechanisms-have virtually unfettered discretion to seize a 
wide variety of property, including nearly all of the spouses' 
community property.47 
46. See, e.g., Eric L. Olsen, How Can a Creditor Reach the Separate Property 
of a Non-Debtor Spouse? Smith v. Dalton, 795 P.2d 706 (Wash. Ct. App. 19901. 
28 IDAHO L. REV. 1100, 1100 n.l (1992); William A. Reppy, Jr., Debt Collection 
from Married Californians: Problems Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse 
Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 143, 168 (1980). 
47. In addition to the significant substantive advantages afforded to 
creditors, the community property regime offers at least one stunning 
procedural advantage. The vast majority of the community property states do 
not require the joinder of the non-debtor spouse for a creditor to enforce a 
judgment against the community property. In effect, the entirety of the 
community property of the spouses, including the non-debtor spouse's one-half 
interest in that community property, may be seized though the non-debtor 
spouse is afforded no opportunity to object or to dispute the underlying debt. 
Only two states, Idaho and Washington, have plainly required the 
joinder of the non-debtor spouse and they have so held only in the context of 
community real property. See, e.g., Willes v. Palmer, 298 P.2d 972, 974-75 
(Idaho 1956); Northwest Bridge Co. v. Tacoma Shipbuilding Co., 78 P. 996, 997 
(Wash. 1904). Washington has overtly rejected the requirement of joinder 
where immovable property is not sought to be seized. See, e.g., Oil Heat Co. of 
Port Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney, 613 P.2d 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). 
Arizona statutes appear to require joinder of both spouses for seizure of 
any community property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann .. § 25-215(D) (1973). But case 
law interprets the statute as one making the non-debtor spouse a necessary, 
rather than indispensable, party. See Flexmaster Aluminum Awning Co. v. 
Hirschberg, 839 P.2d 1128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
What is even more shocking, though, is that some community property 
states not only do not require joinder of the non-debtor spouse before her 
interest in the community property is seized, but do not even require the non­
debtor spouse to receive notice of the pending action. See Robert D. Williams, 
Recent Developments, When Must a Creditor, in an Action to Satisfy an 
Obligation from Community Property, Join Both Spouses? Flexmaster 
Aluminum Awning Co. v. Hirschberg, 839 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), 
29 IDAHO L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1992-1993); see also Yearout v. Am. Pipe & Steel 
Corp., 168 P.2d 174, 176 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946); Cutting v. Bryan, 274 P. 
326, 327 (Cal. 1929); Randono v. Turk, 466 P.2d 218 (Nev. 1970); Jemko, Inc. v. 
Liaghat, 738 P.2d 922, 926 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Bank One, Appleton, NA v. 
Reynolds, 500 N.W.2d 337, 338 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
The problem is most disturbing in the context of garnishment of the 
non-debtor spouse's wages. Wisconsin has maintained its non-joinder and non-
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1. Hinging Creditor Access on Spousal Control-The 
Managerial System 
11 
Today, five community property states-California, 
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, and Texas-are commonly 
categorized under the managerial system of liability. 48 The 
thrust of the managerial system sanctioned by these states is 
that any community property the debtor spouse has the right 
to manage may be seized by his creditor to satisfy a debt 
incurred during marriage.49 Underlying this rule is the 
simple notion that any property a debtor has the right to 
alienate voluntarily to his creditor should also be seizable by 
that creditor in the absence of debtor consent.50 The rule was 
designed to prevent a spouse with few or no separate assets 
from incurring an obligation during marriage, only to have 
the debt become essentially uncollectible.51 Giving creditors 
access to some community property-that portion of it that 
notice rule to find that a wife's wages may be garnished for a debt incurred 
solely by her husband even where she was not a defendant in or given notice of 
the underlying action on her husband's debt. See, e.g., Bank One, 500 N.W. 2d 
at 337. 
Louisiana jurisprudence has recently begun to hold that due process 
requires at least notice of the impending execution for garnishment of the non­
debtor spouse's wages, though notice of the underlying suit is still not required. 
Compare Jackson v. Galan, 631 F .  Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1986) and Rayne State 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Fruge, 546 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1989) with Shel-Boze, 
Inc. v. Melton, 509 So. 2d 106 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
The theory behind a non-joinder or non-notice rule is that "during 
marriage the defendant spouse will guard the community interest and give the 
other spouse whatever notification of the lawsuit he or she should have." 
WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 449 (6th ed. 2004). However sound in the abstract, the rule just 
further clears the way for the creditor. He may assert his rights to all of the 
community property without even the bother of the joinder of or notice to the 
non-debtor spouse. 
48. See REPPY & SAMUEL , supra note 4 7, at 426; Elizabeth De Armond, It 
Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community 
Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 274 (1995). Idaho case law is 
contradictory. The state's courts adopted a managerial approach as early as 
1919, but have inexplicably, and perhaps even unintentionally, applied a 
community debt theory in a few recent cases. See Erik Paul Smith, Comment, 
The Uncertainty of Community Property for the Tortious Liabilities of One of the 
Spouses: Where the Law Is Uncertain, There Is No Law, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 799, 
817-23 (1994). 
49. De Armond, supra note 48, at 274. 
50. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426; see also Smith, supra note 
48, at 810. 
51. Smith, supra note 48, at 810. 
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the debtor spouse could voluntarily alienate-promised to 
alleviate such an inequitable result. 
Unfortunately, because of the still inequitable and male­
dominated nature of the community property management 
scheme at the time the managerial system was developed, it 
could not at first meet this lofty goal. The managerial system 
for determining the extent of debtor liability was first 
developed when husbands were the so-called "head and 
master" of the spousal community in all community property 
states.52 Under the head and master management scheme, 
husband alone could act to obligate the spouses' community 
property, either voluntarily or involuntarily.53 
Problems with the managerial system, as applied to the 
then-existing community property regime, quickly became 
apparent. The most significant issue arose when the wife 
incurred debts, particularly through her tortious actions. 
Since the wife had no rights of management in the 
community property under the head and master scheme, 
none of the community property could be seized to satisfy her 
debts.54 If the wife had no separate property, the managerial 
system's aim of eliminating the inequities to the creditor was 
rendered ineffective. Again, the creditor would go unpaid, 
even if the spouses had a great deal of community property in 
their possession. 
With the late twentieth-century abolition of the head and 
master scheme in all nine community property states55 and 
the move toward a gender-neutral management scheme, the 
managerial system for debt collection necessarily changed 
dramatically as well. In theory, it now allows a creditor to 
seize, either for contractual or tortious debts, any property 
the new gender-neutral management scheme places within 
52. See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 75, 125 (2004). 
53. Under this system, then, all of the community property could be held for 
the acts of a husband, as he managed it all. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last 
One "f!undred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law from the Regulation of 
Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 290 (2003); see also Oppenheim, s upra note 26, at 200-202 ( 1944) (discussing the history of the husband as head and master of the 
community property with control over the administration of all marital 
property). 
54. Spaht, supra note 53, at 290. 
55. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 345; Frantz & Dagan, supra 
note 52, at 125. 
2007] CREDITOR IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY 13 
the control of the debtor spouse. Community property 
managed exclusively by the non-debtor spouse, or that 
managed by the spouses jointly, and the separate property of 
the non-debtor spouse would be immune from seizure in a 
jurisdiction adhering to a "pure" managerial system. 
The most distinctive feature of the managerial system is 
that it views the purpose of the debt incurred as wholly 
irrelevant to creditors' rights. The rule allowing creditors to 
seize the community property managed by the debtor spouse 
applies whether the debt is in the interest of or brings benefit 
to the debtor's family, or is wholly self-interested, and indeed, 
may even undermine the household unit. In Lezine v. 
Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc., for instance, the 
husband forged and then falsely notarized his wife's 
signature on a quitclaim deed to the family home. 56 With the 
forged deed in hand, husband borrowed $240,000 from a local 
savings and loan and mortgaged the marital residence as 
security. Wife had no knowledge of either the forged deed or 
the loan. And more importantly, husband used the loan 
proceeds for his own selfish purposes, bringing no benefit to 
the community.57 Nevertheless, the California Supreme 
Court held the community property-including wife's interest 
in it-seizable for husband's fraudulent debt under a 
managerial system theory. 58 
Although California and Louisiana are often said to 
follow the managerial system, 59 the label does not 
appropriately describe the property available to creditors in 
those states. A strict managerial system would allow a 
creditor, for a debt incurred during marriage, to seize only the 
community property managed by the debtor spouse.60 
However, California and Louisiana, by statute, substantially 
broaden creditor access to reach all community property, 
including that portion of the community property managed 
jointly, and even that managed exclusively by the non-debtor 
spouse.61 The result of these legislative pronouncements is 
56. Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs.,  Inc., 925 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Cal. 1996). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 1006-07. 
59. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426; De Armond, supra note 48, at 
274. 
60. See REPPY & SAMUEL , supra note 47, at 426. 
61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345, 
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that these states truly cannot be described as falling within 
the managerial system; management of community property 
here has no bearing on creditors' rights. But the states are 
nonetheless grouped with Idaho, Nevada, and Texas under 
the managerial umbrella to make it abundantly clear that 
they do not premise creditor access to community property on 
a finding that the debt at issue is in the interest of the family 
or somehow imparts a benefit to the community.62 The 
irrelevance of the purpose of the debt is what unites these five 
states in the "managerial system."63 
At first glance, the managerial system seems rather well­
reasoned. It is certainly an uphill battle to assert that a 
creditor should be able to seize, in satisfaction of the debt 
owed him, less than his debtor could voluntarily surrender. 
Moreover, the managerial system seems relatively creditor­
neutral. By hinging creditor collection on a management 
scheme, the rule does not facially reveal a preference for 
either creditor or spouse. Unfortunately, however, the 
modern move to an equal management scheme and the 
creation of a number of "exceptions" to the managerial system 
in its pure form have undercut the rationality and neutrality 
of the theory, thereby rendering it, once again, a device that 
favors the creditor. 
The move in California and Louisiana toward creditor 
access to all community property, regardless of the 
management rules, rather obviously supports the notion that 
the managerial system's fundamental principles no longer 
prevail. The basic rationale behind the managerial system­
that is, the correlation between voluntary and involuntary 
seizure-has been completely undermined. In both California 
2350 cmt. (c) (1980). There are a few statutory exceptions in California 
exempting the earnings of the non-debtor spouse. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 910 
Law Revision Commission cmt. (West 2004) (discussing the exceptions to the 
general rule laid out in§ 9 10). 
62. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 4 7, at 426; De Armond, supra note 48, 
at 274. 
63. It should be noted that while a creditor's ability to collect from the 
community property does not depend on the classification of the debt as 
community or separate, the order in which he may be able to seize property 
may. Both California and Texas, for instance, have promulgated so-called 
"marshalling" statutes, which may have the effect of requiring a creditor on a 
"separate debt" to attempt to reach the debtor's separate property before going 
after community property. See, e .g . ,  CAL. FAM. CODE§ 1000 (West 2004); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN.§ 3.203 (Vernon 2006). 
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and Louisiana, a creditor may seize even property that the 
non-debtor spouse may not voluntarily alienate-for example, 
the non-debtor spouse's vehicle.64 And neutrality-that is, 
reluctance to protect either the creditor or the spouses in 
preference to the other-in these two states is virtually non­
existent. The state legislatures' decision to favor creditors 
over spouses is all but stated outright. 
Less easily recognized, however, is that Idaho and 
Nevada have just as severely undercut the neutrality and 
rationality of the managerial system. The neutrality of the 
system was, in effect, undermined by the abolition of the head 
and master rule. The regime chosen by eight of the nine 
community property states to replace the previously male­
managed community was, and remains today, equal 
management.65 All community property states but Texas66 
follow this scheme, allowing each spouse alone the right to 
manage, control, and even dispose of virtually any type of 
community property.67 The result of the new equal 
management scheme, when it is linked with the managerial 
system of creditor collection, is that virtually everything 
owned by the spouses is up for grabs.68 With equal 
management, the managerial system is really one that allows 
for seizure of just about all community property, for any self­
interested and non-family-related debt, without such a harsh 
64. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2351, 
cmt. b (1985). 
65. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 9: 12, at 466. 
66. Texas has adopted a "separate but equal" scheme of management, 
wherein each spouse retains the exclusive right to manage what he brings into 
the marriage. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (Vernon 2006); see also 
MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 9:12, at 467; REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 
345. 
67. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100 (West 
2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 ( 1985); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14 (West 
2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.16.030 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.51 (West 2001). 
Of course, equal management is only a default rule. Some property is 
excepted. Community real estate, for instance, is typically managed jointly by 
the spouses, meaning that the concurrence of both is required for its alienation. 
See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 9:12,  at 468. 
68. Indeed, at least one scholar has remarked that "with the advent of 
[equal management] comes an increase in the liability of community property 
for the debts of the spouses." Robert J. Stumpf, Note, Tort Debts Versus 
Contract Debts: Liability of the Community Under California's New Community 
Property Law, 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 1575, 1575-76 (1975). 
16 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47 
label. Connecting the creditor collection theory with the 
realities of equal management reveals that the managerial 
system is no longer neutral. As it is applied in today's 
community property regime, it could hardly favor creditors 
more. 
Worse yet, the rationality of the managerial system has 
been destroyed by a broadening that renders its fundamental 
principles inoperative. Specifically, even states like Idaho 
and Nevada, both of which have equal management and 
operate under a "pure" managerial system69 (i.e., do not 
extend the rule to allow for seizure of all community property 
as in California and Louisiana70), have wholly ignored the 
system's application as it pertains to items managed by the 
spouses jointly. Community real estate gives rise to the most 
significant departure from the managerial system's basic 
principles. Even in a state with an equal management 
scheme, real estate is an asset that must typically be 
managed by the spouses jointly.71 The alienation of 
community real estate, in particular, requires the 
concurrence of both spouses.72 Nonetheless, both Idaho and 
Nevada have allowed the seizure of community real estate for 
a debt incurred by just one spouse during marriage. 73 This 
extension of pure managerial system theory is problematic 
because it is inconsistent with the very premise on which the 
managerial system is based-that of creditor access to 
property the debtor spouse could alone obligate voluntarily.'� 
Allowing a creditor to reach community real property gives 
him far more rights than those given to the spouses 
themselves. 
In short, the change from the head and master scheme to 
equal management, the broadening of the managerial system 
in equal management states to include even jointly managed 
69. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 448 (describing the meaning of 
"pure" community debt system). 
70. See id., at 426; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
71. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-9 12 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
123.230(3) (LexisNexis 2004) . 
. 72 . . see, e.g., Shepherd v. Dougan, 76 P.2d 442, 449 (Idaho 1937) (Ailshie, J., 
d1ssentmg); Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 639 
(Tex. 1987) (Mauzy, J., dissenting) (citing the Florida Constitution). 
73. See, e.g. , Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Seele, 69 P.3d 173, 177 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2003) (citing Holt v. Empey, 178 P. 703 (Idaho 1919)). 
7 4. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 4 7, at 426 . 
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property, and the decisions of C alifornia and Louisiana to 
allow creditor access to all community property and not just 
that managed by the debtor spouse, have morphed the 
managerial system in ways not envisioned at its inception. 
As a result, it is now extraordinarily creditor-friendly. 
2. Delimiting the "Shadowy Boundary" Between Acts 
"Serving the Community" and "Individual 
'Frolics"'-The Community Debt System75 
Arizona, New Mexico, Washington and Wisconsin have 
rejected the m anagerial system and instead opted for what 
has become known as the "community debt system."76 The 
idea behind this system is that community property should 
not be held for any and all debts incurred by either spouse 
during marriage. Rather, in keeping with the status of the 
community as a combination of property in the interest of and 
for the benefit of both husband and wife, the community-and 
particularly the non-debtor spouse's interest in it-should be 
held only for a debt either spouse incurs "while acting for a 
community benefit or purpose."77 Once this purpose or 
benefit test is met, the obligation is classified as a 
"community debt" and the result, in all community debt 
states but Wisconsin,78 is that the entirety of the community 
75. Powell, supra note 7, at 36. 
76. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 4 7, at 444; De Armond, supra note 48, 
at 275; McDonald v. Senn, 204 P.2d 990, 998 (N.M. 1949). 
77. Smith, supra note 48, at 808. Creditors for debts with no such beneficial 
connection to the spouses-that is, creditors for separate debts-certainly may 
not seek satisfaction from all of the community property in a community debt 
state. But whether even the debtor's one-half interest in the community 
property may be held varies among the four states subscribing to the 
community debt system. 
New Mexico and Wisconsin allow all separate creditors to seize the 
debtor's one-half interest in the community property. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-
lO(A) (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2)(d) (West 1985). In the tort 
setting, Arizona "is the only community property jurisdiction to strictly follow 
the community debt rationale . . .  thereby, granting complete immunity to 
community property against separate tort judgments . . . .  " Smith, supra note 
43, at 806; see also Shaw v. Greer, 194 P.2d 430, 431 (Ariz. 1948). Washington, 
in contrast, allows the seizure of the debtor's one-half interest for tort debts, but 
not for contractual debts. Compare deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835, 837 
(Wash. 1980), with Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985). 
78. Wisconsin limits liability for community tort debts incurred during 
marriage to "the property of [the debtor] spouse that is not marital property and 
ll that spouse's interest in marital property." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.55(2)(c)(2)(cm) (West 2001). For contract debts, Wisconsin is aligned with 
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property may be seized in satisfaction of the debt. 79 The 
creditor's interest, then, extends to both his debtor's one-half 
interest in the community property and to the innocent non­
debtor spouse's one-half interest. 
The rule is likely to strike the reader as logical. But its 
application, once again, demonstrates that, perhaps even as 
much as the managerial system, the community debt system 
protects creditors at the expense of an innocent spouse. This 
result does not obtain through the operation of the 
fundamentals of the community debt system itself. Rather, it 
follows from the creation of an evidentiary presumption that 
is intended to aid in the application of the rule and because of 
the definitions of community and separate debts that courts 
have created to determine precisely what marital property 
may be bound for a debt incurred during marriage. 
First, three of the four states subscribing to the 
community debt approach employ a presumption that a 
contractual obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage 
is one for the benefit of the community, and thus is a 
community debt.80 The fourth community debt state, 
Wisconsin, takes the presumption even farther, applying it to 
tort as well as contract debts.81 
Of course, the presumption means that a spouse claiming 
that a debt is separate bears the burden of marshalling 
evidence and so proving.82 Moreover, every community debt 
state has held that it must be overcome not with the 
traditional civil litigation standard of preponderance, 83 but 
the other three community debt states in allowing seizure of all community 
property. Id. § 766.55(b). 
79. See, e.g. , N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-l l(A) (West 2006) ("Community debts 
shall be satisfied first from all community property in which each spouse owns 
an undivided equal interest . . .  , excluding the residence of the spouses. Should 
such property be insufficient, community debts shall then be satisfied by the 
residence of the spouses . . . .  "); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2 1 5  (2000) (stating 
that the entirety of community property may be seized for obligations bringing 
community benefit). 
80. See United Bank of Ariz. v .  Allyn, 805 P.2d 1012, 1019 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990); First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Abraham, 639 P.2d 575, 577 (N.M. 
1982); Malotte v. Gorton, 450 P.2d 820, 821 (Wash. 1969). No such presumption 
exists for tort debts. See, e.g., Garrett v. Shannon, 476 P.2d 538, 540 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1970). 
81 .  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 2001). 
82. See, e.g. , United Bank of Ariz. , 805 P.2d at 1019. 
83. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 437-38 (John 
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
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rather by clear and convincing evidence.84 Wisconsin even 
allows the debtor spouse to make the presumption conclusive, 
and therefore irrebuttable, by executing a unilateral, signed 
statement before the obligation is incurred stating that "the 
obligation is or will be incurred in the interest of the marriage 
or the family."85 The evidentiary effect of such a presumption, 
plainly, is to put the creditor at a significant advantage before 
the collection process even begins. 
Second, even setting aside the presumption, community 
debt states have defined the concept of the community debt so 
broadly that "only a slight connection with the community 
has been required."86 Perhaps the most egregious examples 
come from Washington. In LaFramboise v. Schmidt,87 for 
instance, the Washington Supreme Court found a tort 
judgment for sexual assault on a six-year-old child to be a 
community debt.88 Only the husband perpetrated the assault, 
but because the crime occurred while the child was staying in 
the family home under a paid baby-sitting arrangement, the 
court determined that it was "done in the course of the 
community business" and was therefore a community debt.89 
Likewise, the Washington C ourt of Appeals held in 
Benson v. Bush that an assault by a husband who sprayed 
pepper spray in the plaintiffs face gave rise to a community 
obligation for damages. 90 The altercation in Benson occurred 
on husband's porch, where the plaintiffs and husband's dogs 
began fighting. After breaking up the dog fight, plaintiff and 
husband argued. "Sometime during the melee respondent 
husband said, 'I would like to kill you and your dog."'91 When 
the plaintiff turned to leave, husband became enraged, "spun 
[him] around" and sprayed the chemical into his face. 92 The 
court found the debt for plaintiffs damages to be community, 
84. See, e.g. , Lorenz-Auxier Fin. Group v. Bidewell, 772 P.2d 41, 43 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1989); Malotte, 450 P.2d at 308-309; Warren v. Wash. Trust Bank, 575 
P.2d 1077, 1085 (Wash. App. 1978). 
85. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 1985); see also Bank One, Appleton, 
NA v. Reynolds, 500 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Park Bank-West v. 
Mueller, 444 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
86. deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835, 837 (Wash. 1980). 
87. LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 254 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1953). 
88. Id. at 486. 
89. Id. 
90. Benson v. Bush, 477 P.2d 929, 930 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970). 
91. Id. at 929. 
92. Id. at 930. 
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holding that husband's act "was in the course of or in 
connection with the management of the community 
property. "93 
The debts in LaFramboise and Benson bear so little 
relation to the community that it strains credulity to obligate 
the community under a community debt theory under such 
circumstances. The debts certainly brought no community 
benefit, and arguably did not even maintain a sufficient 
connection to any "community purpose" to warrant seizure of 
the entirety of the community property. Perhaps the real 
driving force behind classifying such debts as community is 
that when the focus is on tort debts and the typically innocent 
victim, these results seem more justifiable. It could be argued 
that, as between the innocent victim and tortfeasor spouse, 
putting the victim in a greater position to be compensated for 
his damages warrants a stretching of the community debt 
principle. 
But one must remember that, in so stretching the 
community debt concept, Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Washington allow seizure of the non-debtor's interest in the 
community property.94 Husband's rape in LaFramboise, for 
instance, would result in a proper garnishment of his wife's 
wages, possibly for the remainder of her working life. Such a 
result once again puts the creditor in a superior position vis­
a-vis both his debtor spouse and an innocent spouse with no 
connection to the debt other than marriage to the debtor. 
All in all, for debts one spouse incurs during marriage, it 
is difficult to say whether creditors fare better under the 
managerial or community debt system. The truth is that they 
fare quite well under both. No matter the system, the 
creditor is very likely to have access to the entirety of both 
the debtor and non-debtor spouse's interests in the 
community property, for any and all manner of debt. 
C. Double-Dipping: Creditor Access to Non-Debtor Separate 
Property 
In addition to the exceptionally broad access a creditor 
has to the community property interest of both spouses, 
creditors often get an even further boon in that they may be 
93. Id. at 929.  
9 4. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
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able to seize the non-debtor spouse's separate property. In 
theory, creditors in a community property regime are not 
given such broad rights of access. Indeed, nearly every 
community property state, as a general rule, prohibits seizure 
of a spouse's separate property for the other spouse's debt.95 
The problem is that exceptions have begun to proliferate that 
threaten to swallow the general rule. Nowadays, every 
American community property state recognizes at least some 
theory which permits the separate property of the non-debtor 
spouse to be seized for debts incurred by the other. 
The most common exception to the general rule 
prohibiting seizure of the non-debtor's separate property is 
embodied in the "necessaries doctrine."96 Recognized by 
statute today in five of the nine community property states, 
the gist of the doctrine is that both spouses are personally 
liable for certain debts, no matter who incurs them. 97 This 
95. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 
913(b)(l) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 2346, cmt. c ( 1 980); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.050 (LexisNexis 2004); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-3- 10 (West 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202 (Vernon 2006); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.200 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2)(d) 
(West 2001). 
96. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 427-28 for a general discussion 
of the necessaries doctrine. 
97. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 914 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.090 
(LexisNexis 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3 .201 (a)(2) (Vernon 2006); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 26. 16.205 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2) (West 
2001). Although no statute in New Mexico sanctions the doctrine's application, 
it was applied by the New Mexico Supreme Court back in 1940. See Nicholas v. 
Bickford, 100 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1940). 
Arizona has apparently rejected the necessaries doctrine. See, e.g., 
REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 428 (citing Samaritan Health Sys. v. 
Caldwell, 957 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)). 
Strangely, Louisiana courts have inappropriately recognized the 
necessaries doctrine. See, e.g., Hall v. Lilly, 666 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (La. Ct. App. 
1996) (holding husband's separate property liable for a promissory note for 
funds to build a home signed by wife alone). The Hall court relied on Louisiana 
Civil Code article 2372, which provides: "A spouse is solidarily liable with the 
other spouse who incurs an obligation for necessaries for himself or the family." 
Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2372). Article 2372, however, expressly 
applies only to spouses who have opted out of the community property regime 
and into a "separation of property regime," as it falls under the chapter of the 
Louisiana Civil Code entitled "Separation of Property Regime." See 16 
KATHERINE S. SPART & W. LEE HARGRAVE, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, 
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES 312 (2d ed., West Group 1997). There is no foundation 
in the Louisiana Civil Code, the primary source of law in Louisiana, see James 
L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation 
of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993), for an application of the 
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personal liability, then, means that both the debtor and non­
debtor spouses' shares of the community property may be 
seized but more importantly, that creditors may even access ' 
98 the non-debtor spouse's separate property. 
Separate property liability is, at least in principle, 
limited under the necessaries doctrine. Although the 
community property states recognizing such a doctrine often 
use differing terminology-restricting this personal liability 
to expenses for "necessaries"99 or, alternatively, "expenses of 
the family"100-the notion is the same. The separate property 
of a non-debtor spouse will only be held for a debt needed to 
support the family. 
Early in the doctrine's history, one court defined it to 
include: 
[S] uch articles of food or apparel, or medicine, or such 
medical attendance and nursing, or such provided means 
of locomotion, or provided habitation and furniture . . .  and 
the like . . .  as the husband, considering his ability and 
standing, ought to furnish his wife for her sustenance, and 
the preservation of her health and comfort. 101 
The idea behind the doctrine was that it furthered the 
spouses' now mutual duty to support each other.102 
Modern barbarizations of the doctrine have extended it 
beyond recognition, though, such that it now covers much 
more than what the average person would likely consider life­
sustaining or necessary. Expenses for a maid, 103 and even 
paying an appellate attorney to render legal aid on a criminal 
conviction for marijuana possession 104 have become 
necessaries in the modern community property regime. The 
result, of course, is that creditors benefit. The expansion of 
the necessaries doctrine has allowed them to reach even 
necessaries doctrine to spouses living under the state's default regime of 
community property. 
98. Thomas M. Featherston, Jr. & Amy E. Douthitt, Changing the Rules by 
Agreement: The New Era in Characterization, Management, and Liability of 
Marital Property, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 271, 3 16-17 ( 1997). 
99. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 914 (West 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.501, 
3.201 (Vernon 1997). 
100. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §  26. 16.205 (West 2005) . 
. l?L Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219,  221 (Wis. 1980) (c1tmg Warner & Ryan v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 5 17, 519 (Wis. 1871) ). 
102. See id. 
103. See Wisnom v. McCarthy, 192 P. 337 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920). 
104. See State v. Clark, 563 P.2d 1253 (Wash. 1977). 
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beyond community property to the separate property of the 
non-debtor spouse for debts that arguably carry little benefit 
for the family. 105 
The necessaries doctrine is not the only theory 
community property states have employed to allow creditors 
to seize the separate property of the non-debtor spouse. A 
number of community property states have also employed 
agency theories for this purpose. 106 Agency theory has been 
applied in cases involving contractual liability, of course. For 
example, in Lucci v. Lucci, 107 the Washington Supreme Court 
found a husband personally liable for loans incurred solely by 
his wife for the purpose of maintaining a grocery store 
business. 108 Husband was illiterate, and perhaps as a 
consequence, his wife managed the business exclusively.109 
When the wife alone signed a note for groceries for the store, 
husband was nevertheless held responsible-and therefore 
his separate property bound-under agency principles. 110 The 
court reasoned that "by [the spouses'] mutual agreement 
[wife] was the managing agent of the grocery business."111 
Perhaps more strangely, community property states have 
even used the agency doctrine to impose liability on the non­
debtor spouse in tort cases. In Zernott v. Hobbie, 112 for 
instance, a Louisiana appellate court found a husband 
personally liable for the injuries of a minor victim struck by a 
car driven by his wife. 113 The court premised its holding on 
the notion that the husband was "vicariously liable" for his 
wife's torts.114 
105. Indeed, as one commentator remarked, "Recognizing that most doctrine­
of-necessaries cases today do not involve a neglectful spouse who refuses to 
provide food, shelter, and clothing to the other spouse, it becomes apparent that 
the doctrine owes its continued existence to its use as a collection device for 
creditors." Shawn M. Willson, Comment, Abrogating the Doctrine of Necessaries 
in Florida: The Future of Spousal Liability for Necessary Expenses After Connor 
v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031, 
1043 (1997). 
106. Agency theory is occasionally applied to spouses by common law courts 
as well. See, e.g. , Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Zimmerman, 381 N.W.2d 218 (S.D. 1986). 
107. Lucci v. Lucci, 99 P.2d 393 (Wash. 1940). 
108. Id. at 396, 399. 
109. See id. at 396. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Zernott v. Hobbie, 146 So. 2d 729 (La. Ct. App. 1962). 
113. Id. at 732. 
114. Id. Admittedly, agency and vicarious liability theories are not 
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Community property states have applied theories of 
ratification to the spouses with mixed results. In Alphonse 
Brenner Co. v. Phillips,115 a Louisiana court found that a 
husband's use and enjoyment of non-necessary furniture 
purchased by his wife obligated husband's separate 
property.116 The husband made "no objections to the 
purchases made by his wife,'' and his "ratification" of her 
purchase rendered him personally liable.117 On the other 
hand, the Washington Court of Appeals, in Smith v. Dalton, 
while not rejecting the application of a ratification theory to 
bind a non-debtor spouse's separate property in theory, 
refused to apply it to obligate a wife's separate property for a 
boat purchased by husband.118 
The wife's acts in Smith arguably rivaled those of the 
husband in Phillips. The divergent results are difficult to 
justify, as Mrs. Dalton apparently made no objection to her 
husband's purchase of or procurement of the loan for a boat 
(though the evidence does indicate that she had minimal 
participation in both transactions).119 Wife did use and enjoy 
the boat for leisure purposes "several times,"120 presumably as 
synonymous. Absent any better explanation for the court's holding, however, 
community property scholars have couched the Zerrwtt decision as one resting 
on principles of agency. See, e.g., REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 427. 
Louisiana courts have likewise employed principles of apparent 
authority to bind the non-debtor s pouse's separate property. See, e.g. , Joe 
Bonura, Inc. v. Parham, 413 So. 2d 2 14 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Alphonse Brenner 
Co. v. Dickerson, 283 So. 2d 849 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
Both the Zernott and Bonura decisions were rendered during the head 
and master period in Louisiana, when only husband could act to bind the 
community property. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (describing 
the "head and master" management scheme). In this light, it makes a bit more 
sense that the courts would stretch to meet the principles of agency. In the 
absence of agency, the community property would not be bound for either wife's 
torts or contracts, and wife's separate property would be the only property 
available to satisfy the debt. With the abolition of the head and master doctrine 
in �uisiana in 1980, courts should now be more hesitant to employ agency, as 
creditors now have full access to the entirety of the community property in 
Louisiana for a wife's debts. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2345 ( 1985); see also 
REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 4 7, at 426. 
115. Alphonse Brenner Co. v. Phillips, 338 So. 2d 183 184 (La. Ct. App. 
1976). 
' 
116. Id. 
117. Id. ; see also Royal Furniture Co. of Baton Rouge v. Benton 256 So. 2d 
614, 616 (La. 1972). 
' 
1 18. Smith v. Dalton, 795 P.2d 706 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
119. Id. at 708. 
120. Id. at 710. 
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the husband in Phillips used and enjoyed the furniture. 
Nevertheless, the Washington court found such use of the 
boat insufficient to give rise to ratification. 121 
Even quasi-contractual theories like unjust enrichment 
are occasionally employed in community property states to 
bind the non-incurring spouse's separate property. In First 
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance. Co. , a 
Louisiana court found a husband personally obligated for his 
wife's embezzlement debt on a theory of unjust enrichment 
where the embezzled funds were deposited into a joint 
checking account.122 Arguably, unjust enrichment was 
inappropriately used for creditor access to separate property, 
at least under the facts of First State Bank. When the 
embezzled funds were deposited into the joint bank account 
there, it was the "marital community" that profited and not 
the non-debtor husband.123 The unjust enrichment should 
therefore have been repaid from the community property, and 
not the non-debtor's separate property. Nevertheless, quasi­
contractual theory has been applied, at least in Louisiana, to 
hold separate property. 124 Other states have plainly rejected 
the application of such a theory to bind the separate property 
of the non-debtor spouse.125 
Finally, some scholars suggest that the Roman law 
principle of negotiorum gestio, or "management of the affairs 
of another," may apply in Louisiana-though likely not in any 
other American community property state126-to give 
121. Id. Ratification was also rejected b y  the Washington court in Nichols 
Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1 1 14 (Wash. 1985), where a wife specifically 
expressed her disapproval of a loan her husband made to their son. 
122. First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. , 399 So. 2d 729 
(La. Ct. App. 1981). Ratification was not a possibility in First State Bank 
because husband had no knowledge of his wife's embezzlement. Id. at 731.  
123. Compare id. with Smith, 795 P.2d at 7 10 (finding no individual 
"enrichment" to spouse that did not use item purchased by other). 
124. See, e.g. , SPART & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 3 13 (discussing First 
State Bank, 399 So. 2d 729). 
125. See Smith, 795 P.2d at 710. 
126. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2292 cmt. a (1997). Negotiorum gestio is a 
civilian institution with no common law equivalent. See John P. Dawson, 
Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic lntermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819, 836 
(1961). Thus, its application seems possible only in Louisiana, a jurisdiction 
with a private law heavily based on the Roman civilian tradition. T.B. Smith, 
The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed Jurisdictions," in CIVIL 
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 10 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965) 
Cnoting the influence of Roman law on Louisiana law). 
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creditors access to the non-incurring spouse's separate 
property. 127 No Louisiana court has ever applied these 
principles for such a purpose, but the doctrine certainly seems 
ripe for application here. The institution of negotiorum gestio 
allows a person to act to manage another's affairs, even 
without authority, when he reasonably believes the other 
would sanction such action. 128 More importantly, it imposes 
on the person whose affairs are managed a duty "to fulfill the 
obligations that the manager has undertaken."129 Whether 
this duty may allow a creditor access to separate property has 
yet to be litigated, but the scope of the rule certainly leaves 
open the possibility. 
In sum, what seems like a relatively straight-forward, 
and rather creditor-limiting rule in community property 
states-that creditors typically may not seize the separate 
property of a non-debtor spouse-is not so limiting after all. 
The promulgation of exceptions such as the necessaries 
doctrine, agency theory, ratification and quasi-contractual 
theories such as unjust enrichment and perhaps even 
negotiorum gestio have so eroded the general rule that it 
hangs on only by a thread. A creditor trying to seize a non­
debtor spouse's separate property in a community property 
state these days will likely not be disappointed by the wide 
variety of options available. 
D. Sacrificing Autonomy in the Marital Relation: Creditor 
Ability to Disregard Spousal Separation of Property 
Agreements 
Spouses domiciled in any of the nine community property 
states today are free to contract around their state's legal 
regime. 130 They can and do modify the legal regime (both 
127. SPART & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 312. 
128. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2292 ( 1997). 
129. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2297 (1997). 
130. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1500 (West 
2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 ( 1980); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (1985); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.070 (LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3A-1 
to -10 (West 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.202 (Vernon 2000); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 26.16. 120 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.58 (West 2001); see 
also Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington (Revised 
1985)_, 61 WASH. L. REV. 13, 104-07 ( 1986); Mary Moers Wenig, Taxing Marriage, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD . 561 ,  568 (1997). Most states limit the freedom of the spouses to enter into just any 
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before and after they marry) in a myriad of ways. 131 Spouses 
may, for example, increase the assets of the community132 by 
adopting the "universal community," whereby the community 
includes not only the acquets and gains of the marriage, but 
also any property brought into the marriage by either 
spouse. 133 Spouses may likewise decrease the assets of the 
community134 by agreeing that the fruits of separate property, 
which are community property in most community property 
jurisdictions, 135 will remain separate property. Management 
provisions may be modified, as may the rules regarding the 
spouses' rights to reimbursement upon dissolution. 136 The 
possibilities are virtually endless. 
Even with all of these possibilities, by far the most 
commonly executed matrimonial agreement in community 
property states is the separation of property agreement.137 
Perhaps not coincidentally, these agreements are the ones 
most likely to affect creditors' rights to collect on debts owed 
by the spouses. When spouses sign a separation of property 
agreement, they typically agree that the property each 
acquires-through earnings, inheritance, or any other 
vehicle-during marriage will remain his separate 
property.138 Essentially, they are excluding the legal regime 
matrimonial agreement. In Louisiana, for example, spouses may enter into 
matrimonial agreements derogating from the rules of the legal regime of 
community property set out in the Louisiana Civil Code, but they may not 
"renounce or alter the marital portion or the established order of succession" or 
"limit with respect to third persons the right that one spouse has alone under 
the legal regime to obligate the community or to alienate, encumber, or lease 
community property." LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2330 ( 1985). 
131. While postnuptial contracts were once disfavored, the last twenty years 
have seen their acceptance grow such that they are now on par with prenuptial 
agreements. See Laura Schofield Bailey, Note, Marital Property Agreements­
Being Creative with the New Legislation, 43 LA. L. REV. 159, 160 (1982) 
(Louisiana prohibited post-nuptial agreements until 1979); Rebecca Glass, 
Comment, Trading up: Postnuptial Agreements, Fairness, and a Principled New 
Suitor for California, 92 CAL. L. REV. 2 15, 222-23 (2004). 
132. SPART & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 538. 
133. Patrick N. Parkinson, Who Needs the Uniform Marital Property Act?, 55 
U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 699 n.1 10 (1987). 
134. SPART & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 539. 
135. Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward R ules 
and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 805 ( 1999). 
136. SPART & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 540-43. 
137. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 33; see also SPART & HARGRAVE, 
s upra note 97, § 8.9, at 539. 
138. See SPART & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, § 8.9, at 539 (discussing the 
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of community property altogether if they sign the agreement 
before marriage, or, if they sign during the course of the 
marriage, are "effectively dissolv [ing] the community even 
though the marital relation continues to exist."139 
The impact of a separation of property agreement on a 
creditor, assuming it binds him, is great and apparent. That 
creditor will now have rights of access to the property of the 
debtor spouse only. 140 He will have no ability to reach 
property earned or acquired by the non-debtor spouse.141 
Further, these basic rules are not altered based on the debtor 
spouse's inability to pay. If the creditor in a community 
property state becomes a party to a juridical relation with an 
unemployed spouse with no substantial assets, for example, 
the creditor's recourse after a binding separation of property 
agreement, with the limited exceptions addressed in prior 
sections, is solely to squeeze anything possible from the 
unemployed debtor spouse. Reaching the other spouse's 
assets is generally not a possibility. 142 In essence, the signing 
of a separation of property agreement by spouses domiciled in 
a community property state, if binding on a creditor, puts 
that creditor in the same position he finds himself in the 
forty-one non-community property states.143 
The fairness of this change in position for the creditor 
depends upon the timing of the creditor's relationship with 
the debtor spouse. There are two possibilities. A creditor 
may have established a relationship with his debtor prior to 
the execution of a separation of property agreement; thus, 
relative to the separation of property agreement, he is an 
"existing creditor." On the other hand, a creditor may have 
established a relationship with his debtor subsequent to the 
signing of the matrimonial agreement; thus, relative to the 
ability to designate various property under such an agreement in Louisiana 
including a total separate property regime). 
' 
139. Joann H. Henderson, Marital Agreements and the Rights of Creditors, 19 
IDAHO L. REV. 177, 203 (1983). A marital agreement executed during the 
existence of a community property regime may have a particularly strong effect 
on creditors, as it may "transmute O" community property to separate property. 
See td. at 177; see also REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 33. 
140. See MCCLANAHAN , supra note 4, § 10:1, at 478. 
141. Id. 
142. See SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, § 8.9, at 539 ("Specified assets 
can be kept out of the community . . . .  "). 
_
143. See McC�AHAN, supra note 4, § 10: 1, at 478 (discussing jurisdictions 
without commumty property systems). 
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separation of property agreement, he is a "future creditor." 
In theory, at least, existing and future creditors should 
garner substantially different legal treatment. One might 
expect that community property states would sanction the 
enforcement of separation of property agreements against 
future creditors of the spouses, but not against existing 
creditors. After all, existing creditors have arguably 
established justifiable expectations that are not present, at 
least to the same degree, for creditors who have not yet lent. 
Surprisingly, however, no community property state overtly 
distinguishes between these two classes of creditor. 144 Both 
existing and future creditors' fates are bound up together in 
the various state laws that determine whether third parties 
will be affected by matrimonial agreements. 
At first blush, it may seem that the spouses' ability to 
contract around the legal regime of community property in all 
of the American community property states strikes a blow to 
all creditors. It is apparently the lone instance in the 
community regime when the rights and freedom of the 
spouses take precedence over their creditors. Yet in this case, 
appearances are deceiving. While it is true that, if binding, 
matrimonial agreements may significantly limit the rights of 
creditors, community property states have displayed an 
almost shocking resistance to applying these contracts to 
creditors. 
1. Complete Ineffectiveness 
Nevada provides the starkest example of this resistance. 
Spouses are permitted (through special statutory authority) 
to enter into matrimonial agreements which change the 
characterization of property that would be community under 
the state's default regime.145 Separate property agreements, 
of course, do just that, and thus are sanctioned by Nevada 
law.146 However, such agreements are "effective only as 
between" the spouses.147 Third parties, most notably 
creditors, may disregard these agreements altogether, as they 
are wholly inapplicable to them. No other American 
144. See generally id. § 10:6-:7 (discussing creditors' rights, but identifying a 
distinction between the type of debt rather than the type of creditor). 
145. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (LexisNexis 2004). 
146. Id. § 123.070. 
147. Id. § 123.220. 
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community property state so blatantly allows the rights of 
creditors (either existing or future) to trump the freedom 
spouses have to contract with one another and to have that 
contract be respected by outsiders. 
2. Effectiveness Only Upon Actual Notice to Creditor 
Wisconsin has taken an only slightly less creditor­
friendly stance on the enforceability of separation of property 
agreements affecting creditors.  A separation of property 
agreement there may not "adversely affect[] the interest of a 
creditor unless the creditor had actual knowledge of that 
provision when the obligation to that creditor was incurred . .  
"148 
This statutory provision makes Wisconsin's rule one that, 
in effect, though not facially, treats existing and future 
creditors differently. Under this actual knowledge rule, 
existing creditors necessarily are unaffected by the spouses' 
separation of property agreement, as they could not have had 
actual knowledge of an agreement not in existence at the time 
credit was extended.149 Existing creditors, therefore, receive 
complete protection under Wisconsin's actual knowledge rule. 
However, the rule seems to entail at least the possibility 
that separation of property agreements between the spouses 
will have significant negative impact on future creditors. 
Those creditors aware150 of an agreement contrary to the 
community property regime will be bound by that agreement 
and will hold only the rights creditors in common law states 
enjoy-namely, the right to access the debtor spouse's 
property alone.151 The reality of the rule's application, 
though, is much less antagonistic to creditors. 
148. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(4m) (West 2001). The Uniform Marital 
Property Act, on which Wisconsin's community property rules are based 
contains the same provisions. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 8(e), 9 U.L.A'. 
10.'3 (1983). 
1 _49. See, e.g. , Bank One, Appleton, NA v. Reynolds, 500 N.W.2d 337, 338-39 
(Wis'
, 
Ap�. 1993) Cfi_n�ing that the marital property agreement did not preclude 
bank s seizure of wife s wages under guaranty agreement where obligation was 
entered into earlier). 
1 5? . Rec?rdation of a matrimonial agreement in Wisconsin provides a 
creditor neither actual nor constructive notice. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.56(2)(a) 
(West 200 1 ). 
1 5 1 .  MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 10: 1 ,  at 478· Newman supra note 1 5  at 
526 n.177.  
' ' ' 
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Although Wisconsin's actual knowledge rule does not 
expressly distinguish between creditors in tort and contract, 
its effect is to divide the two. Tort creditors of the spouses, 
even after a separation of property agreement is signed, will 
likely lack knowledge of the agreement.152 As such, there is 
"no effective way, by marital property agreement, that 
spouses m ay limit the exposure of marital property for tort 
obligations incurred," precisely because of this lack of 
knowledge.153 For tort creditors, then, the seemingly harsh 
actual knowledge rule may as well be the Nevada "no effect" 
rule.154 It is essentially the same, though less transparent. 
Even for contractual relationships, the actual knowledge 
rule has the effect of placing the burden of imparting 
knowledge of the matrimonial agreement on the spouses 
rather than their creditors. In effect, it sets up perverse 
incentives for a creditor, putting him in a better position if he 
doesn't inquire into the existence of or take steps to discover 
whether the spouses have executed a separation of property 
agreement. 155 The duty to inform is left on the shoulders of 
the spouses, who are typically less sophisticated, and 
especially given the lack of creditor incentive to raise the 
issue of a marital agreement, much less likely to bear it. 
In the end, for all types of credit relationships, 
Wisconsin's knowledge rule is exceptionally benevolent to 
creditors. In its application, it is not at all far removed from 
the Nevada approach of prohibiting spousal separation of 
property agreements from affecting creditors altogether. 
152. See John T. Cross, The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United 
States Choice-of-Law, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 455 (2003) (tort liability is 
typically unplanned). 
153. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55 legislative council note. 
154. See, e. g.,  Schultz v. Sykes, 638 N.W.2d 76, 79-80 (Wis . Ct. App. 200 1) 
(finding a marital agreement ineffective against plaintiff establishing tort by 
wife because plaintiff had no knowledge of the agreement at the time of the 
tort). 
155. Wisconsin does require creditors covered by the Wisconsin Consumer 
Act delivering written credit applications to include a notice that "no provision 
of a marital property agreement . . .  adversely affects the interest of a creditor 
unless the creditor, prior to the time credit is granted, is furnished a copy of the 
agreement . . . or has actual knowledge of the adverse provision when the 
obligation to the creditor is incurred." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.56(2)(b) (West 
2001). The rule is a good start at shifting the burden of proof to creditors that 
should be expanded beyond transactions involving written credit applications. 
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3. Effectiveness Upon Recordation 
Several community property states attempt to balance 
the rights of the spouses to enter into an agreement 
effectively modifying their legal regime with the rights of 
creditors by imposing a recordation requirement.156 Under 
such a theory, a separation of property agreement is binding 
between the spouses from the moment of its execution, but 
binds third-party creditors only if recorded.157 States forcing 
recordation do so in substantially different ways, with 
different results obtaining for creditors of the spouses. The 
common thread, though, is that a recordation requirement of 
any kind for the enforceability of matrimonial agreements 
makes for one of the most spouse-friendly alternatives. Yet 
even with recordation requirements, creditors garner 
significant protection. 
a. For Any Effectiveness at All 
Louisiana has taken a comparatively bold step in favor of 
placing spousal rights to enter into binding marital 
agreements above creditors' rights. 158 The Louisiana Civil 
Code provides that "a matrimonial agreement . . .  is effective 
toward third persons as to immovable property, when filed for 
registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the 
property is situated and as to movables when filed for registry 
in the parish or parishes in which the spouses are 
domiciled."159 Any type of creditor, for any type of property, 
then, is bound by a matrimonial agreement only if it is 
recorded. 
The Louisiana Civil Code goes farther than any other 
community property state in favoring the spouses by 
enforcing separation of property agreements against both tort 
and contract creditors consistently and against creditors with 
concerns in both movable and immovable property 
consistently. It also adopts the most spouse-friendly solution 
in hinging the enforceability of matrimonial agreements on 
recordation because it rejects inquiries into actual notice.160 
156. See, e.g. , IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-917 to -919 (2006); LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2332 ( 1985). 
157. See, e.g. , LA. Crv. CODE art. 2332 ( 1985). 
158. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 79-80. 
159. LA. C!V. CODE art. 2332 (1985). 
160. See Lee Hargrave, Public Records & Property Rights, 56 LA. L. REV. 535, 
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The actual knowledge of a creditor surrounding the execution 
of a matrimonial agreement is irrelevant in Louisiana; he is 
bound by the agreement only if it is properly recorded. 161 
b. For Real Estate Only 
Idaho requires marital agreements, including separation 
of property contracts, to be recorded, but scales back the 
Louisiana rule to require recordation only for contracts that 
affect real estate. 162 Under such a rule, some creditors, 
namely mortgagees, are highly protected. They are not bound 
by separation of property agreements unless those 
agreements are recorded in the county of the real estate's 
situs.163 There is certainly a possibility that a creditor may be 
prejudiced by such a recordation rule; he may lose his right to 
collect in accordance with his expectations if he does not 
check the records and discover a separation of property 
agreement. But most would likely find such a result 
appropriate. "Greater care is taken with realty transactions; 
more money is involved than with many items of personal 
property so that a title search and insurance are customary . .  
"164 
The real estate recordation requirement seems to strive 
toward the same worthy goal that Louisiana's recordation 
requirement does-making matrimonial agreements between 
the spouses enforceable only by creditors who have notice of 
them and, contrary to the Wisconsin method, actually placing 
the burden of gaining that knowledge on the creditor rather 
than the spouses. But the Idaho rule misfires in at least two 
ways. 
First, the rule is flawed in that it fails to deal with the 
spouses' relationship with the vast majority of their creditors 
by limiting its application to separation of property 
agreements affecting real estate. The rule plainly leaves 
548-50 (1996). 
161. See id. 
162. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-917 to -919 (2006). The language of the Idaho 
statute actually only covers "marriage settlements," but it has been construed to 
apply to marital agreements such as separation of property contracts as well. 
See Stevens v. Stevens, 16 P.3d 900, 903 (Idaho 2000); see also W.J. 
BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 81-82 ( 1962). 
163. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-91 7  to -919 (2006); see also Henderson, supra 
note 139, at 179. 
164. Henderson, supra note 139, at 180. 
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creditors dealing with the spouses on personal property 
unprotected. Spousal separation of property agreements 
presumably can affect these future creditors of the spouses on 
debts relating to personal property, and they may be forced to 
take subject to unknown, and even "secret," separation of 
property agreements.165 
If such a rule prevailed in Idaho because it was found to 
best balance the rights of the spouses with those of their 
creditors, the rule would be justifiable, and maybe even 
praiseworthy for elevating the spouses' ability to make 
binding agreements above creditors' rights. It seems more 
likely, though, that it is just another inconsistency without 
theoretical justification. Particularly given the large volume 
of wealth associated with personal property transactions 
these days, personal property creditors of the spouses should 
be granted the same rights to contest spousal separation of 
property agreements as those granted to real estate creditors. 
Idaho missteps in treating the two classes of creditors 
differently. 
Second, the Idaho recordation rule leaves tort creditors 
unprotected. Mortgagees or any other creditors with some 
connection to a particular parcel of spousal land will check 
the records for a separation of property agreement or fairly be 
limited to the separate property assets of the incurring 
spouse. Judgment creditors, and especially tort creditors, are 
not in such a position for advance planning. 166 The 
recordation of a matrimonial agreement will not be discovered 
by these parties until well after the debtor-creditor 
relationship has arisen, yet the contract will nevertheless 
bind them. The "notice" function of the recordation 
requirement is wholly ineffective here. 
While it makes some sense to enforce separation of 
property agreements even against creditors not in a position 
to discover them in advance of the creation of a juridical 
relation with the spouses, it does not make sense to do so in 
the way Idaho does. Idaho's rule essentially favors the 
contractual, real estate-oriented creditors over the spouses, 
but then subordinates tort creditors to the spouses. If Idaho's 
goal in adopting a recordation requirement is to allow 
165. Id. 
166. See id. 
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creditors the opportunity to discover separation of property 
agreements before they will be bound by them, then the state 
should adopt a rule that affords the same protection to tort 
creditors of the spouses-with no possibility of discovering a 
recordation before the obligation is incurred-as is granted to 
contractual creditors like mortgagees. In short, the laudable 
spousal protection that could be achieved through a 
recordation rule is ill-applied when it is limited to real estate 
scenarios.  The result-placing contractual creditors above 
the spouses but tort creditors behind them-is theoretically 
indefensible and inequitable. 
4. Effectiveness as to Creditors Only Upon Mutual 
Observance by the Spouses 
Finally, Washington allows matrimonial agreements 
between the spouses to be enforced against creditors only 
when those agreements are "mutually observed" by the 
spouses.167 The rule aims to ensure that marital agreements 
are not "shams" or deals undertaken solely to immunize the 
spouses from liability to their creditors. 
Washington courts have applied the requirement to allow 
creditors to garnish the wages of a non-debtor spouse despite 
the existence of a separation of property agreement.168 In In 
re Diafos, for instance, a premarital tort creditor of the 
husband sought to garnish the non-debtor wife's wages, 
claiming that, as community property, they were seizable for 
husband's tort debt. 169 Wife defended on grounds that she 
and her husband had signed a prenuptial agreement 
establishing a regime of separation of property, and that the 
agreement precluded husband's creditor from seeking 
recourse from her earnings.170 The court allowed the creditor 
167. Mumm v. Mumm, 387 P.2d 547, 549 (Wash. 1964). This theory of 
enforceability of marital agreements is different from the others discussed in 
this section because it is not solely a matter of creditor enforcement. To be valid 
even between the spouses themselves, a marital agreement in Washington must 
be mutually observed. Id. However, its frequent use as a creditor-asserted 
defense makes it an appropriate subject for study here. See, e.g. , Kolmorgan v. 
Schaller, 316 P.2d 111  (Wash. 1957); In re Diafos, 37 P.3d 304 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001). 
168. See, e.g. , Kolmorgan, 316 P.2d at 111; In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 304. 
169. In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 306. 
170. Id. at 308. 
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to attempt an attack on the m arital agreement171 and noted 
that "[c]ourts will honor a challenged property agreement 
between husband and wife if the party asserting the 
protection of the agreement can demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence . . .  that both spouses have abided by the 
agreement."172 
The idea behind requiring mutual observance before a 
marital agreement will bind creditors is basically an 
equitable one. The Diafos court explained that "it would 
encourage a sorry state of affairs in our domestic relations . . .  
[if spouses were able] to charge the community with all the 
expenses of the living . . .  and credit the separate estate with 
the gross earnings."173 In light of this policy objective, the 
mutual observance requirement is often described as a ban on 
"disproportionate[] subsidizing."174 Use of one spouse's 
separate earnings to pay for everyday expenses that benefit 
the couple and simultaneous attempts to use a separation of 
property agreement to block creditor access to those same 
earnings-or disproportionate subsidizing-is prohibited. 175 
The gist of the rule is that spouses may not assert a marital 
agreement against a third-party creditor when they 
themselves are not complying with the spirit of the 
agreement and truly remaining "separate in property." 
Whatever the justification for the rule, it provides 
another hurdle for spouses attempting to deviate from the 
community property regime's harsh collection rules. The 
spouses' contract may be scrutinized on yet another basis not 
covered under the general rules of contract enforcement. A 
finding of non-observance, once again, can only help the 
Washington creditor. 
When the rules regarding creditor seizure of community 
1 7 1 .  Prior jurisprudence and doctrine indicated that separation of property 
agreements in Washington would not be binding on existing creditors-those 
"whose basic claim[s] existed at the time of the agreement." See Fisher v. 
Marsh, 125 P. 951 (Wash. 1912); Cross, supra note 130, at 107 (1986). More 
recent Washington jurisprudence, with the Diafos decision standing as a clear 
example, h�s apparently rejected the distinction and allowed both existing and 
future creditors to be bound by marital agreements provided they are not 
mutually observed. See In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 304. 
172. Id. at 309. 
173. Id. (quoting Kolmorgan, 316 P.2d at 111). 
174. See, e.g. , id. at 309; REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 460. 
175. In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 309. 
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property, both for debts incurred during and before marriage, 
are considered along with doctrines allowing creditor access 
to non-debtor separate property, the picture for the spouses is 
bleak enough. Since the tide toward equal management 
swept the community property states: 
The wife may now obligate the community funds, not only 
for the debts she creates during the marriage, but also for 
her antenuptial debts . . . . The common funds are now 
available to creditors of both husband and wife during 
marriage, and an individual spouse's creditors may seek 
satisfaction from the community assets . . .  as well as from 
the separate assets of the debtor-spouse. Married women, 
formerly wailing for access to one-half of the community 
property as security for their debts to promote increased 
extension of credit to them now have that credit in double 
measure . . . It is the best of all possible worlds for the 
creditor. 1 76 
The rules trending toward non-enforcement of matrimonial 
agreements against third-party creditors merely reinforce 
this creditor superiority. 
III. ARE CREDITORS OVERPROTECTED? 
Creditors of spouses living under the community regime 
are in a demonstrably strong position. But is this really a 
problem? It is certainly a relevant consideration in 
evaluating "the excellence of a system of law applicable to 
marital property."177 If the community property regime is to 
continue to stand the test of time and persist in the American 
states in the midst of overwhelming acceptance of the 
common law marital property system, its efficacy will have to 
be continually supported. The propriety of the system should 
be evaluated both with reference to "the 'fairness' of the 
adjustments made by it between spouse and spouse" and "by 
the extent to which it affords adequate protection to all 
parties concerned when the family" deals with creditors.178 
The community regime does a great deal to help the spouses' 
creditors. Arguably, it does too much in light of its purpose, 
176. Nina Nichols Pugh, The Evolving Role of Women in the Louisiana Law: 
Recent Legislative and Judicial Changes, 42 LA. L. REV . 1571, 1575-76 (1982) 
(emphasis added). 
177. Powell, supra note 7, at 16-17. 
178. Id. at 17. 
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other more general laws, and party expectations. 
A. Straying from the Rationale Behind the Regime 
[Vol: 47 
An examination of the rationale behind the adoption of 
the community regime in the nine community property states 
shows just how far the regime has strayed from its initial 
goals. The reasons typically cited by the western and 
Spanish-influenced states for their nineteenth-century initial 
adoption of the community property system are really quite 
clear. At the time, the most salient and well-respected 
feature of the community was its innovations in the area of 
women's rights. 179 Simply put, the early community property 
regime was perceived as a system that improved upon the 
common law's treatment of women.180 
The community property regime's history demonstrates 
its strides in this area. The regime is believed to have 
originated as early as the fifth century with Germanic tribal 
peoples. 181 Far from wallflowers and servants, the female role 
in these societies was one of partnership with the male in the 
varied, and often violent, tasks required for daily survival.182 
"[T]he wives who shared the fighting were thought to be 
worthy of a share in the spoils."183 Thus, while the common 
law of the time subscribed to a theory of "merger," whereby a 
wife's legal personality merged with her husband's upon 
marriage and she was incapable of owning property,184 the 
civil law began to conceive of the wife's status in marriage 
differently. 
This perception of the wife as a valuable contributor to 
the family gave rise to the notion that the mass of acquets 
during marriage to which each spouse contributed-"the 
community"-should be shared equally by the spouses.185 The 
179. Kirkwood, supra note 5, at 11 .  
180. See MCKAY, supra note 5, at 64-65; Kirkwood, supra note 5, at 11 .  
181 .  See HARRIETI SPILLER DAGGETI, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM 
OF LOUISIANA 4 (1945); DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 39, at 17- 18, supra 
note 5, at 7. 
182. See DAGGETI, supra note 181,  at 4. 
183. Id. 
184. S
.
ee Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and 
l�emoralizatwn, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 
Umm;u, L. REV. 45, 48 ( 1981). 
185. GRACE G. BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (4th ed. 
2003). 
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community regime, then, diverged from the common law 
through its recognition of the marriage between husband and 
wife as a sort of economic partnership.186 
The traceable history of the adoption of the community 
property regime in the few American states that have chosen 
it reveals that this same purpose prompted the initial 
adoption of the regime. Unfortunately, few legislative 
discussions have been preserved that enable historians to 
look into the minds of early nineteenth-century lawmakers 
deciding between the traditional common law matrimonial 
property scheme and the then-foreign community property 
regime. 187 The relatively scant record that does exist, 
however, is quite telling. 
California's 1849 Constitutional Convention, 
surprisingly, provides the most insight. The delegates to the 
convention had before them not a choice between adoption of 
a common law or community property system, but rather a 
proposal making clear that property acquired by a wife before 
marriage and afterwards by donation would be her separate 
property. 188 The proposed "Section 13" read: 
All property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or 
claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired 
afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be her 
separate property, and laws shall be passed more clearly 
defining the rights of the wife, in relation as well to her 
separate property as that held in common with her 
husband. Laws shall also be passed providing for the 
registration of the wife's separate property.189 
Even though the decision of whether to adopt the community 
property regime was not plainly raised by Section 13's text, 
the delegates "realized that . . . Section 13 embodied 
something more than simply the establishment of married 
women's property rights, and that it was rooted in Spanish 
law."190 The delegates, then, spent the majority of their time 
186. Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 3, at 771. 
187. Kirkwood, supra note 5, at 9. 
188. See J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF 
CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER 
AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 257-58 (1850). 
189. Id. at 257. 
190. Donna C. Schuele, Community Property Law and the Politics of Married 
Women's Rights in Nineteenth-Century California, 7 W. LEGAL HIS. 245, 255 
(1994). 
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in this area debating the community and common law 
systems for handling spousal property.191 
Speaking in favor of Section 13 and the civilian notion of 
community property in general, one delegate-Tefft, a New 
York lawyer originally from Wisconsin192-argued its 
necessity to protect the "helpless" family from a husband 
"bring[ing] his family to penury and want."193 More light­
heartedly, delegate Halleck, a bachelor and California's then­
Secretary of State, 194 noted: 
I am not wedded either to the common law or the civil law, 
nor as yet, to a woman; but having some hopes that some 
time or other I may be wedded . . . I shall advocate this 
section in the Constitution, and I would call upon the 
bachelors in this Convention to vote for it. I do not think 
we can offer a greater inducement for women of fortune to 
come to California. It is the very best provision to get us 
wives that we can introduce into the Constitution.195 
Without much objection, Section 13 was adopted, and 
became a part of California's 1849 Constitution. 196 And while 
the provision did not clearly mandate a community regime, by 
the late nineteenth century, California was recognized as a 
community property state. 197 
More than one hundred years later, the state of 
Louisiana was revisiting the community property articles of 
its Civil Code, first put into written form in 1808. 198 The 
reporter of a group of scholars that worked under the 
Louisiana State Law Institute to revise Louisiana's 
matrimonial regimes law, 199 in discussing the policies that 
should be in the foreground of any reform, cited, among other 
191. See BROWNE, supra note 188, at 257-69. 
192. Brian McGinty, Common Law and Community Property: Origins of the 
California System, 51 CAL. ST. BAR J. 478, 481 (1976). 
193. BROWNE, supra note 188, at 259. 
194. McGinty, supra note 192, at 481. 
195. BROWNE, supra note 188, at 259. 
196. Id. at 269. 
197. BLUMBERG, supra note 185, at 75-76. 
198. MOREAU LISLET, A DIGEST OF THE CML LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE 
TERRITOR; OF ORLEANS 323-24 (1808); see also Robert A. Pascal, Updating 
lowstana s Community of Gains, 49 TuL. L. REV. 555, 555 (1975). 
1�9: The Lo'."1isiana State Law Institute is the scholarly group created by the 
Loms1ana Legislature to undertake the study and drafting of Louisiana civil 
law reforms. Katherine S. Spaht, Background of Matrimonial Regimes 
Revision, 39 LA. L. REV. 323, 323 (1979). 
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things, the community's: ( 1 )  "recognition of spouses as 
equals"; (2) allowance of "freedom . . .  to agree that each may 
serve the family in different ways without either one 
suffering any lesser position in relation to property by a 
choice of a function that does not directly bring new wealth 
into the family"; and (3) "encourage[ment] [of] each spouse to 
serve the family with best abilities, and encourage[ment] of 
mutual respect for the service each performs."200 
The comments of both the delegates to the 1849 
California Constitutional Convention and the reporter on 
Louisiana's matrimonial regimes revision are important 
because they demonstrate the impetus for the adoption and 
retention of the community property regime. It seems that 
scholars and lawmakers in the nineteenth century, just as in 
the twentieth century, desired " [to] implant D a more 
equitable property system for spouses and [to] provid[e] a 
family binder at a time of apparent crisis in the family 
relation."201 Both the California delegates' and the Louisiana 
reporter's comments make this clear. The driving forces 
behind the adoption and retention of community property 
regimes were a desire to protect the family, grant equality 
and recognize both spouses' contributions, and even 
encourage immigration and new marriages. 
Despite this strong undercurrent of family values, which 
propelled the adoption of community property laws, the rights 
of creditors were not ignored either in Louisiana's late 
twentieth-century revision or in the 1849 California 
Constitutional Convention. In California, for instance, a 
number of vociferous delegates decried the burden on 
creditors resulting from the insulation of any property of 
either spouse. Delegate Botts, an attorney and magazine 
editor from Virginia, 202 spoke most openly in favor of 
creditors' rights: 
200. JANET MARY RILEY, LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, REVISION OF 
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870, BOOK III, TITLE VI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVE 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL 5 (1976). 
201. DAGGETT, supra note 181, at 3 10; see also MCKAY, supra note 5, at 65 
("In this combat of social forces the advantage of the community property 
system is that it is a conservative power operating to keep for us the old spirit of 
the family.") . 
202. McGinty, supra note 192, at 48 1.  
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I want to know to whose benefit is this provision to enure? 
What is the provision? That a married woman shall enjoy 
the use and control of her own property without any 
regard to the acts and doings of her husband; that is to 
say, that the husband and wife together may enjoy my 
property and yours, and become possessed of thousands 
and thousands, leaving us beggars; and then, sir, under 
this system, while they are indebted to us together for 
that which they here jointly used and occupied, under the 
pretence of this clause, they may leave us pennyless while 
they revel in luxury.203 
Section 13 ultimately passed despite these creditor concerns. 
Thus, while creditors' interests were certainly considered in 
the adoption of the community property regime in California, 
they were "subordinated to the well-being and interest of the 
family. n204 
This glance at history highlights the problem with the 
community regime today. The community property states 
have taken gradual steps in favor of creditors' rights in 
different areas which, viewed individually, are nearly 
imperceptible. But when considered in globo, it becomes 
obvious that this emerging favoritism for creditors is taking 
us farther and farther away from allowing the community 
regime to serve the purposes for which it was created.  
To the extent state lawmakers sought to prevent families 
from being rendered helpless by one spouse's bad acts 
through the adoption of the community regime,205 many of 
today's American community property regimes are a failure. 
The liability of the entirety of the community property in 
Louisiana for either spouse's premarital debts, for instance, 
subjects the family to considerable financial risk for debts 
likely wholly unconnected to it. This modern "innovation" did 
not come from the community's Spanish ancestors206 and 
clearly leans away from the family protection behind adoption 
of the community property regime. 
Similarly, if delegate Halleck's desire to attract women to 
203. BROWNE, supra note 188, at 268. 
204. John D. Lyons, Development of Community Property Law in Arizona, 15 
LA. L. REV. 512,  524 0955) (quoting 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY 468-69 ( 1943)). 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 192-197. 
206. See Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 5 12-13 (La. 1973) 
!Summers, J., dissenting). 
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a community property state,207 or more appropriately in 
today's world, citizens in general, is one shared by the 
populus, the American community property regimes are 
bound to fail. Few persons with knowledge of a scheme 
allowing seizure of all community property for antenuptial 
debts and refusing to enforce a valid separation of property 
agreement avoiding this harsh effect would choose such a 
regime on its merits. The regime itself, at least today, should 
push prospective citizens to flee! Assuming any spouse were 
choosing among potential domiciles solely on the basis of their 
matrimonial regimes-which, of course, is unlikely-the 
creditor-friendly nature of the community property regime 
may overwhelm its positive partnership-like features and 
make it an easy loser in comparison with the marital property 
regime of the forty-one common law states. 
The problem may even be more severe though. For those 
spouses-likely the vast maj ority-who choose a domicile for 
reasons other than the property regime it affords, the new 
creditor bent of the community property regime may even 
discourage marriage. Particularly when a state refuses to 
recognize the validity of a matrimonial agreement 
establishing a separate property regime, few choices remain 
available .  Unable to contract out of an undesirable regime, 
and unwilling to move, the parties may opt for some 
arrangement other than marriage.208 The community's 
envisioned "binder at a time of apparent crisis in family 
relation"209 is all but destroyed.  
B. Ignoring Creditor Repayment Estimates 
Yet another problem with the broad grant of rights to 
creditors in community property states is that reasonable 
creditor expectations are either overlooked or ignored. 
Creditors in both contract and tort may well win the 
figurative lottery if their previously single debtors marry in a 
community property state. The creditor may experience a 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 194-195. 
208. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02, cmt. b (2000); see also Developments in the Law­
The Law of Marriage and Family, Marriage as Contract and Marriage as 
Partnership: The Future of Antenuptial Agreement Law, 1 16 HA.RV. L. REV. 
2075, 2084 (2003). 
209. See DAGGETT, supra note 181, at 3 10.  
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windfall not possible in the forty-one non-community property 
states in having available for seizure assets to which he 
should not have reasonably anticipated access.210 The most 
egregious example of such a windfall, of course, is the liability 
of the entirety of the spouses' community property for the 
premarital-and likely wholly un-family-related-debt of a 
single spouse.211 
In contractual arrangements, "credit is [typically] 
extended based on an estimate of the debtor's ability to repay 
out of future income. "212 Because of the bargain struck by the 
parties, the creditor should certainly be permitted to collect 
from the debtor in accordance with his estimates. Holding 
the debtor's wages after marriage immune merely because 
those wages have become part of the community between 
husband and wife, besides making possible the marital 
bankruptcy, is problematic because it removes fairly 
estimated income from the creditor's grasp.213 Indeed, every 
American community property state has so recognized in 
allowing for the seizure of some community property to satisfy 
a single spouse's premarital debt. 214 
What some community property states have failed to 
recognize, however, is that overcorrecting to prevent the 
marital bankruptcy215 results in inequities just as severe. 
"Antenuptial creditors extend credit . . . while [the debtor 
spouse] has only a separate estate; they do not bargain for, 
and should not, after the marriage, be entitled to the benefit" 
of a community estate that includes the non-debtor spouse's 
earnings and acquisitions. 216 Allowing an antenuptial 
creditor to seize the entirety of the community property 
simply gives that creditor a windfall in allowing him not only 
the future income and acquisitions of his debtor, but also 
those of a third party to the debtor-creditor relationship. The 
creditor gets an unbargained-for advantage.217 
210. See supra Part II.A. 
2 1 1 . See supra Part II.A. 
212.  Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, LW.bility of Community Property for 
Antenuptial Debts and Obligations, 68 A.L.R. 4th 877, 883 ( 1989). 
213.  MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, at 490; Fischer, supra note 2 13,  at 883. 
2 14. See supra notes 2 1-23 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra Part II.A. 
216.  Cr�ech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 513 (La. 1973) (Summers, 
J . ,  d1ssentmg). 
217. See 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 . 1  (rev. ed. 1993) 
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For contract creditors, then, the rule of full community 
property seizure should be rejected in favor of a rule that 
more accurately effectuates the parties' expectations at the 
time of their agreement. Allowing a creditor to access some of 
the community property of a debtor who was single when the 
debt was incurred and later marries is necessary to prevent 
the marital bankruptcy and to appropriately honor the 
creditor's future income estimates, thereby giving him his 
bargained-for due. But given the contrary interests of the 
family, and the need for protection of the earnings of a new 
spouse uninvolved in the debt, these problems can be less 
intrusively handled by allowing the premarital creditor to 
seize only his debtor's wages after marriage. More 
expansively, a creditor could be granted access to his debtor's 
one-half interest in the community property, regardless of the 
means of acquisition. This approach may even better honor 
creditor income estimates, as a creditor will typically consider 
not only earnings, but also profits from passive investments 
and any other "income" the prospective debtor is likely to 
bring in when making the lending decision. 218 Some 
community property states have adopted these more modern 
solutions, appropriately balancing the interests of the spouses 
vis-a-vis their creditors. 219 Other community regimes, 
particularly Louisiana, in allowing seizure of the entirety of 
the community property for either spouse's premarital 
contractual obligations, 220 remain woefully inadequate. 
The idea that a creditor should have access to community 
(describing the very purpose of the body of contract law as a means of ensuring 
that bargains are upheld and reasonable expectations protected). 
218. In lieu of either articulated solution, present Spanish law generally 
immunizes the community property from the spouses' premarital debts. See 
Creech,  287 So. 2d at 509 n.12 (discussing the Codigo Civil de Espana). 
However, once all community obligations have been satisfied and the separate 
property of the debtor spouse has been extinguished, the community property 
may be held. See id. 
219. See, e.g. , NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.050 (LexisNexis 2004) ("Neither 
the separate property of a spouse nor his share of the community property is 
liable for the debts of the other spouse contracted before the marriage."); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (1983) (debtor's earnings bound for his premarital debt, 
provided judgment is entered within three years of marriage); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.55(2)(c)(l)  (West 2001) (stating premarital debt may be satisfied from 
debtor's separate property "and from that part of marital property which would 
have been the property of that spouse but for marriage"). 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 24-45. 
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property only insofar as it honors his expectations before the 
debtor-creditor relationship was solidified is certainly less 
persuasive when torts are considered. The tort creditor, of 
course, bargains for nothing, 221 and is entitled to be made 
whole for his damages without regard to his expectations. 
Full liability of community property, however, still goes too 
far. It allows the seizure of the non-debtor spouse's earnings, 
which have no connection to the other's premarital debt. This 
windfall a tort creditor gets when his previously single debtor 
marries is simply inappropriate. Such a boon cannot be 
sanctioned where the earnings and income of the innocent 
spouse are at stake. "If courts would maintain the integrity 
of the community regime . . .  , in a conflict between the rights 
of the creditor and the security and well-being of the wife and 
family, the choice must lie with the interpretation favoring 
the wife and family."222 
C. Providing Unnecessary Layers of Protection 
Further problems with the creditor-friendly nature of the 
rules governing marital property in community property 
states are exposed when other, more general legal rules in 
those jurisdictions are given due consideration. Quite often, 
the community property regime provides a creditor protection 
duplicative of that afforded all parties under other basic legal 
principles. The community property states' move toward 
binding separate property under the necessaries doctrine and 
toward disregarding the provisions of separation of property 
agreements are just two examples of unnecessary 
overprotection. 
1. Agency as a Replacement for the Necessaries Doctrine 
The proliferation of rules binding the non-debtor spouse's 
separate property for debts for necessaries incurred by the 
other certainly increases the likelihood that a creditor for 
necessaries will succeed in recovering the monies due him.223 
An additional theory of recovery often not available in non­
community property states is now granted the creditor.224 
221. See Cross, supra note 152, at 455. 
222. Creech, 287 So. 2d at 513 (Summers, J., dissenting). 
223. See Willson, supra note 105, at 1043- 1 044. 
224. Most common law states at some point recognized the necessaries 
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The problem with the necessaries doctrine as applied here is 
that, once again, it goes too far. Doctrines of agency, well­
accepted in every state no matter its marital property 
scheme,225 could just as competently handle the problem with 
less theoretical discord. When agency principles are applied 
between the spouses, the result is the same as that of the 
necessaries doctrine-the separate property of the non-debtor 
spouse is held for the debt, despite the non-debtor's lack of 
participation in the debt's creation. 
Taking agency seriously as the only method of binding 
the non-debtor's separate property could potentially result in 
fewer proper seizures of such property than the necessaries 
doctrine currently allows.  Since the abolition of the head and 
master scheme of management, spouses are no longer 
considered agents of each other merely by virtue of their 
marital relationship.226 To bind a non-debtor's separate 
property under agency theory, actual, implied, or apparent 
authority would be needed, as with all principal-agent 
relationships.227 But such authority, particularly implied, 
would likely exist for debts incurred for the shelter, food, and 
clothing of the spouses. Such debts-those that truly embody 
the meaning of the word "necessaries"-comport with the 
original concept of the necessaries doctrine. 228 
The true advantage of jettisoning the necessaries 
doctrine in favor of a reliance on agency principles is that it 
would prevent courts from having to expand the concept of 
"necessaries" ridiculously, and from thereby rendering the 
doctrine utterly illogical. The purpose of the debt would be 
less important, and instead, the authorization of the non-
doctrine to encourage provision of supplies to women, who were legally unable 
to contract for them on their own. See id. at 1031-32. However, a number of 
states abrogated the doctrine in the wake of twentieth-century recognition of a 
woman's existence as a legal person separate and apart from her husband. See 
id. at 1050. Only twenty-eight common law states still recognize the doctrine. 
See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 838 
(2004). 
225. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS, ESSENTIAL 
TERMS AND CONCEPTS § 2.1, 2 .8-12 (1996). 
226. Joann Henderson, For Better or For Worse: Liability of Community 
Property After Bankruptcy, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 893, 908 (1992). 
227. HAMILTON, supra note 226, § 2.1. 
228. See Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 2 19, 221 (Wis. 
1980). 
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debtor, through actual or apparent authority, would be the 
critical inquiry. There is simply no need for the necessaries 
doctrine given modern agency theory. 
2. Fraudulent Transfer Statutes for the Protection of 
Existing Creditors 
The community property push toward allowing creditors 
to disregard marital agreements that are otherwise binding 
between the spouses likewise unnecessarily overprotects. 
Rules governing fraudulent transfers are now a part of the 
law in all nine community property states,229 and these rules 
provide a remedy to those creditors most deserving of special 
protection when a debtor spouse attempts to modify the 
community property regime. Less deserving creditors should 
bear the burden of self-protecting. 
To understand how the problem of the enforceability of 
marital agreements against third-party creditors would be 
treated absent special, and overreaching, community property 
rules, it is necessary to do what most community property 
states seem to have rejected-that is, to treat existing and 
future creditors separately. Once such a division is made, it 
becomes easier to see how the current community property 
treatment of creditors affords them too many rights. 
Existing creditors are those unquestionably worthy of the 
greatest protection, particularly those that lent to j ust one 
spouse while the community regime was in progress.  230 It 
could certainly be argued that, given the proliferation of 
marital agreements and the likelihood that the spouses could 
opt out of the community at any moment, a creditor should 
229. See Marsha E .  Simms, Acquisition Financing, in PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE, ASSET-BASED FINANCING 2006, at 346-47 (2006) (noting that all 
community property states but Louisiana have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act). The Louisiana Civil Code allows creditors to use the revocatory 
and/or oblique actions to set aside transfers that would likely qualify as 
fraudulent transfers in other states. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2036 2044 
( 1987).  
' 
230. Of course, a creditor may lend to an unmarried spouse who later 
marries and signs a separation of property agreement. In this sit�ation, it is 
eve� easier to see why the community property rules rejecting the application of 
marital agreements to existing creditors should be set aside. The creditor here 
stands in the shoes of all creditors for antenuptial debts and there is no 
justification for allowing him to recover more than his future income estimates 
parbcularly when allowing him more would require setting aside an otherwis� 
valid contract between husband and wife. 
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never form an expectation of seizing any of the non-debtor 
spouse's community property.231 To the extent such 
expectations can be properly formed, though, they are more 
appropriately formed by the creditor that lends to a married 
spouse involved in an ongoing community property regime. 
Given the proliferation of divorce nowadays, creditor reliance 
on marital status as a continuing one may be unreasonable. 
But at least the non-debtor spouse here is identified-indeed, 
she exists, and has already formed a relationship with the 
debtor-and her income could conceivably be considered in 
the decision of whether to extend credit, albeit to the debtor 
spouse alone. When the married debtor spouse later enters 
into a separation of property agreement, his creditors 
arguably deserve some protection, as their reasonable 
expectations may not be honored by holding them to the 
separation of property agreement "made in the face of [the} 
existing debt."232 
But granting an existing creditor the necessary relief 
does not require a resort to any sort of complete non­
application of marital agreements, recordation rule, or 
mutual observance requirement that the community property 
states have developed. The problem is capably handled by 
principles of fraudulent transfer. Indeed, such concepts, as 
"the main source of protection for unsecured creditors whose 
debtors improperly transfer property . . .  , are particularly 
appropriate for transfers between spouses, where the transfer 
is viewed with some suspicion."233 
Applying the community property states' basic 
fraudulent transfer principles would allow a creditor to reach 
property transferred "with intent to defraud,'' as well as any 
property transferred by an insolvent debtor.234 A narrowly­
tailored rule like this more appropriately balances the rights 
of the spouses to make meaningful adjustments to their own 
marital property regime (and to enforce that agreement 
. 231. Moreover, even as to the debtor spouse's property, the creditor has no 
�nterest in any particularized item. He may expect to be able to seize, for 
instance, his debtor's wages, but he does not know what those wages will be and 
the debtor may do plenty to reduce that which is available. See Henderson, 
supra note 139, at 204. 
232. 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 
§320, at 559 (rev. ed. 1940). 
233. Henderson, supra note 139, at 186. 
234. Id. ; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-913 (2003). 
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against third parties) with the rights of creditors that arose 
before that agreement than does a broad rejection or 
recordation rule.235 
Admittedly, fraudulent conveyance principles will not 
often apply to allow future creditors of the spouses to ignore a 
matrimonial agreement made before the debt was incurred. 
Absent some right in the creditor existing before the 
fraudulent transfer, there is no basis on which to set aside the 
agreement. 236 Fraudulent transfer principles typically only 
apply to allow existing creditors relief. 237 This result just 
demonstrates the beauty of the solution in this context. 
Future creditors deserve no protection from a marital 
agreement that existed before the obligation was ever 
incurred. As will be demonstrated in the next section, 
applying the fraudulent transfer principles in this context as 
well-to refuse a future creditor the right to set aside his 
debtor's existing marital agreement-more properly allocates 
the burden between the creditor and the spouses. 
D. Inappropriately Placing the Burden 
As applied to future creditors of the spouses, the various 
rules on marital agreement enforceability, in effect, place the 
burden on spouses to act to make their otherwise valid 
agreement effective against third-party creditors. For 
example, the spouses must record their agreement in 
Louisiana, 238 or give all of their prospective creditors actual 
notice of it in Wisconsin.239 In Nevada, the spouses are 
utterly incapable of making a separation of property 
235. Some courts have suggested that fraudulent transfer or conveyance 
provisions are inadequate remedies for the spouses' creditors because the most 
common type of marital agreement is the separation of property agreement, 
which arguably does not amount to a "transfer." See, e.g. , Pietri v. Pietri (In re 
Pietri) ,  59 B.R. 68, 70-71 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986). Arizona, at least, has 
expressly rejected such a narrow interpretation of the term "transfer" and has 
allowed an existing creditor to use the state's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
as a shield to a marital agreement that purported only to change the "character 
of [the spouses'] future earnings." State v. Wright, 43 P.3d 203, 205 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
236. See, e.g. , Douglas J. Whaley, The Dangerous Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 73, 85, 118 n.195 (2003). 
237. Id. 
238. See supra Part Il.D.3.a. 
239. See supra Part II.D.2. 
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agreement that binds their creditors. 240 These rules are, 
indeed, creditor-friendly, and, again, I submit, too creditor­
friendly in light of the alternatives. 
Future creditors of the spouses, at least their voluntary 
or contractual creditors, have an extraordinary ability to self­
protect that weighs against giving them additional special 
protection.241 Most simply, the creditor can develop 
appropriate expectations as to what property may be 
available to satisfy the debt of his prospective married debtor 
by asking! Certainly, creditors can bear the simple burden of 
"inquir[ing] as to agreements between the spouses and the 
status of their property."242 Such a question could protect the 
creditor quite nicely if accompanied by a rule estopping 
spouses who claim "they have not and will not contract out of 
the community property system" from "later claim [ing] 
otherwise."243 Such questions may seem silly for informal 
transactions involving movable goods or services, for example, 
but, no matter the type of transaction, if the creditor chooses 
not to ask, he should be bound by the agreement between the 
spouses, and, as he would be in any non-community property 
state, allowed to recover only from his debtor's property.244 
Further, a creditor desiring additional protection may require 
security for the debt, thus binding a particular piece of 
property to guarantee repayment, or even better, demand the 
signature of both spouses, making the property of either 
seizable. 245 
Because today's community property regime is one from 
which spouses are given the right to opt out246 and spouses 
make widespread use of all manner of matrimonial 
agreements to do just that, no creditor should be able to 
240. See supra Part II.D.l. 
241. Christine Davis, Note, 'Til Debt Do Us Part: Premarital Contracting 
Around Community Property Law-An Evaluation of Schlaefer v. Financial 
Management Service, Inc., 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1051, 1056 (2000). 
242. Henderson, supra note 139, at 208. 
243. Id. 
244. See Newman, supra note 15, at 526 n.177. 
245. Henderson, supra note 139, at 208. Federal law imposes some 
restrictions on a creditor's ability to demand the signatures of both spouses. For 
a comprehensive discussion of these limitations, see Todd M. Johnson, 
Limitations on Creditors' Rights to Require Spouses' Signatures Under the 
ECOA and Washington Community Property Law, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
333 (1981). 
246. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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seriously contend that he was unaware that the spouses may 
have modified the community principles governing debt.247 
Thus, " [t]he issue comes down to a policy question: Who 
should have the burden to protect his interests?"248 Must the 
spouses explain their deviation from the community property 
regime to a prospective creditor, "or should the creditor have 
to protect himself by inquiring as to the state of the spouses' 
property rights?"249 Placing the burden on a creditor to 
overcome the argument that the spouses' separation of 
property agreement binds him more logically and 
appropriately balances the parties' rights. In view of the level 
of sophistication and already "significant protection [given 
creditors] under [state] community property doctrine"250 and 
the creditors' "opportunity to self-protect [by inquiring as to 
the spouses' status or requiring that both spouses incur the 
debt] in the case of premarital agreements that abrogate 
community property principles,"251 a set of special community 
property rules governing creditor respect for separation of 
property agreements is just too much. 
Some argue that placing the burden of overcoming a 
marital agreement on creditors is improper because tort 
creditors cannot fairly bear it. "Tort liability cannot be 
planned in advance" and a future tort creditor of the spouses 
cannot protect himself through negotiation.252 Moreover, such 
a scheme has been criticized as a costly one that would 
"increase[] the price to all customers" of creditor products and 
services . . .  "253 It has been said that "all spouses would have 
to bear increased costs for the benefit of those who elect to 
change the ownership of their property."254 
These arguments, however, overlook the fact that the 
247. The Nevada creditor may be the sole exception, as he knows the spouses 
may make no agreement that can affect his rights. See supra text 
accompanying notes 145-147. 
248. Henderson, supra note 139, at 208; see also AUDREY WITKOWSKI, WIS. 
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, STUDY PAPER: AN 
EXAMINATION OF DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAWS IN THREE COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY STATES AND SOME INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MODEL 
MARITAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 1-2 ( 1977). 
249. Henderson, supra note 139, at 208. 
250. Davis, supra note 242, at 1056. 
251. Id. 
252. Henderson, supra note 139, at 209. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
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forty-one non-community property states have been operating 
in this manner for centuries. Tort creditors in common law 
states may not seize both spouses' wages for one's tortious 
activity, despite the fact that those debts are unanticipated.255 
A tort creditor deserves to be made whole from the property of 
the party that injured him.256 That the tortfeasor later 
marries a spouse with hefty earnings should not give the 
victim an additional debtor to pursue. Moreover, non­
community property states certainly have not seen costs 
skyrocket merely because creditors are limited to seizing 
their debtors' property alone. There is no evidence to suggest 
that goods and services are more expensive in these common 
law states than they are in community property states. 
In short, there is no economic justification for retaining 
the current creditor-friendly rules regarding the 
enforceability of marital agreements. The burden the creditor 
in a community property state would have to bear if the rules 
involving enforcement of marital agreements were changed to 
allow for broader applicability to creditors would be no 
greater than the burden the creditor in a non-community 
property state bears every day. In the absence of an economic 
justification, and in light of the strong familial interest and 
creation of the community property regime to protect rather 
than to hinder the economic efforts of married couples, 257 the 
current rules overprotecting creditors with regard to their 
avoidance of spousal agreements seem unjustified .  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The modern community property regime is 
extraordinarily creditor-friendly. Some modifications of the 
general rules of creditor collection are necessary in the 
community context to effectively balance the rights of the 
spouses and their creditors. The problem of the potential "$2 
bankruptcy,'' for example, necessitates holding some 
community property for a spouse's premarital debts to avoid 
sanctioning marriage as a means of debt avoidance. But 
255. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, at 478; Newman, supra note 15, at 526 
n.177. 
256. Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the 
Goals of Tort Law, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 163, 205 (2004). 
257. See Riley, supra note 201. 
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providing full community property liability is unnecessary 
and unfair. The future earnings of the non-debtor spouse 
should not be held under any theory, and particularly where 
they are unanticipated by the creditor. Likewise, full 
community property liability for debts incurred during 
marriage is inappropriate. A creditor lending to a married 
person in a community property state gets the undeserved 
perk of an additional party's assets without bearing any 
responsibility for making that party a debtor. Such results 
would never obtain in a common law jurisdiction, where a 
creditor, absent agency or some other exceptional theory, has 
rights to his debtor's property alone. Yet the spouses are 
often not free in community property states to adopt the rules 
of debt collection that would apply in those forty-one states 
without meeting exceptionally onerous requirements. 
The community regime's deviation from the common law 
scheme of marital property in this regard is unwarranted and 
unnecessary. Nothing inherent in viewing spouses as 
contributing, among themselves, to a sort of partnership­
and sharing equally in that partnership during marriage and 
beyond-necessitates a substantially divergent regime from 
that obtaining in the common law with respect to third-party 
relations with the spouses. Indeed, community property 
jurisdictions, while retaining their innovations in the area of 
family support and protection, would do well to borrow 
appropriate rules of debt collection from common law states.  
In so doing, the community property regime may have a 
greater hope of maintaining its attractiveness to married 
couples for the centuries to come. 
